Nowadays, novel techniques such as Reciprocal effortless in vitro fertilization (ReIVF) enable two individuals to “carry the same pregnancy,” that is to “carry” the same embryo in both their bodies. However, even though these techniques are likely to be increasingly requested, little is known about their safety and efficacy, and much less about their bioethical legitimacy and issues. Considering their uniqueness, this study assesses the compatibility of ReIVF as well as of another similar technique with the classical principles of medical (...) ethics: autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. The aim is twofold: (i) to start investigating whether these techniques and their underlying reasons are, or could ever be, bioethically justifiable and (ii) to make clinicians and any other potentially interested persons such as researchers, lawmakers and prospective parents themselves are more aware of the health and social implications of using these techniques. Hence, after a brief overview of the technical aspects of the procedures that allow two persons to carry the same pregnancy, this study offers a general moral framework that can be useful for starting to address some relevant aspects of these procedures, such as their benefits and harms on the health of the individuals involved, the reasons behind their use, and the possibility that they might be covered by states in the future. Finally, this study provides a bioethical overview on ReIVF as well as on similar techniques considering different perspectives, while also suggesting some questions and recommendations for further research. (shrink)

The use of reproductive techniques and the eventual reproductive negligence from the provider of reproductive services gave rise to situations in which the intended parents are deprived of raising a child genetically connected to them. Courts have been dealing with cases of those for years, but have systemically denied claimants compensation, failing to recognise as damage the loss of genetic connection. In 2017, for the first time, the Singapore High Court provided compensation for that damage, labelled “loss of genetic affinity”. (...) This paper will argue that the damage in question is the loss of genetic connection and results from a violation of reproductive rights because a key element of reproductive rights is to have children with whom we keep a genetic bond and raise them. The paper will explain why the arguments classically argued against such compensation are unfounded and it will argue for a compensation covering both patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages. (shrink)

Donor conceived persons are likely to have a lower quality of life than persons who are genetically related to both parents. Empirical evidence is presented to corroborate this point. The evidence is subdivided into three sections: (1) negative experience of the donor conception itself, (2) negative effects of secrecy and openness and (3) negative effects of donor anonymity and donor identifiability. The principle of procreative beneficence requires parents to select the child with the best possible life. Given the difference in (...) quality of life, intended parents should try to have a genetically related child. This finding is also a strong reason for society to invest public resources in the development of techniques that enable people to create genetically related children. (shrink)

BackgroundDuring the last decade, the possibility for women to cryopreserve oocytes in anticipation of age-related fertility loss, also referred to as social egg freezing, has become an established practice at fertility clinics around the globe. In Europe, there is extensive variation in the costs for this procedure, with the common denominator that there are almost no funding arrangements or reimbursement policies. This is the first qualitative study that specifically explores viewpoints on the (lack of) reimbursement for women who had considered (...) to uptake at least one social egg freezing cycle in Belgium.MethodsTo understand the moral considerations of these women, drawing from twenty-one interviews, this paper integrates elements of a symbiotic empirical ethics approach and thematic analysis.ResultsWe identify four themes: (1) being confronted with unclear information; (2) financial costs as ongoing concern; (3) necessity of coverage; (4) extent of reimbursement. In the first theme, we found that some women were concerned about the lack of clear information about the cost of social egg freezing. In the second theme, we report moral sentiments of injustice and discrimination which some women attributed to their struggles and needs not being recognised. The third theme illustrates diverse views on reimbursement, ranging from viewing social egg freezing as an elective treatment not appropriate for reimbursement to preferences for greater public responsibility and wider access. Finally, we describe the participants’ varying proposals for partial reimbursement and the idea that it should not be made available for free.ConclusionsThis research adds important empirical insights to the bioethics debate on social egg freezing, in particular by presenting (potential) users’ views on the lack of reimbursement. While there is much more to say about the ethical and political complexities of the reimbursement of this procedure, our study highlighted the voices of (potential) users and showed that at least some of them would welcome the coverage of SEF through the public healthcare insurance. (shrink)

BackgroundBreakthroughs in animal studies make the topic of human application of ectogenesis for medical and non-medical purposes more relevant than ever before. While current data do not yet demonstrate a reasonable expectation of clinical benefit soon, several groups are investigating the feasibility of artificial uteri for extracorporeal human gestation.Main textThis paper offers the first comprehensive and up to date discussion of the most important pros and cons of human ectogenesis in light of clinical application, along with an examination of crucial (...) ethical (and legal) issues that continued research into, and the clinical translation of, ectogenesis gives rise to. The expected benefits include advancing prenatal medicine, improving neonatal intensive care, and providing a novel pathway towards biological parenthood. This comes with important future challenges. Prior to human application, important questions have to be considered concerning translational research, experimental use of human fetuses and appropriate safety testing. Key questions are identified regarding risks to ectogenesis’ subjects, and the physical impact on the pregnant person when transfer from the uterus to the artificial womb is required. Critical issues concerning proportionality have to be considered, also in terms of equity of access, relative to the envisaged application of ectogenesis. The advent of ectogenesis also comes with crucial issues surrounding abortion, extended fetal viability and moral status of the fetus.ConclusionsThe development of human ectogenesis will have numerous implications for clinical practice. Prior to human testing, close consideration should be given to whether (and how) ectogenesis can be introduced as a continuation of existing neonatal care, with due attention to both safety risks to the fetus and pressures on pregnant persons to undergo experimental and/or invasive procedures. Equally important is the societal debate about the acceptable applications of ectogenesis and how access to these usages should be prioritized. It should be anticipated that clinical availability of ectogenesis, possibly first as a way to save extremely premature fetuses, may spark demand for non-medical purposes, like avoiding physical and social burdens of pregnancy. (shrink)

Despite the frequent invocation of ‘false hope’ and possible related moral concerns in the context of assisted reproduction technologies, a focused ethical and conceptual problematisation of this concept seems to be lacking. We argue that an invocation of ‘false hope’ only makes sense if the fulfilment of a desired outcome (eg, a successful fertility treatment) is impossible, and if it is attributed from an external perspective. The evaluation incurred by this third party may foreclose a given perspective from being an (...) object of hope. However, this evaluation is not a mere statistical calculation or observation based on probabilities but is dependent on several factors that should be acknowledgeable as morally relevant. This is important because it allows room for, and encourages, reasoned disagreement and moral negotiation. Accordingly, the object of hope itself, whether or not based on socially embedded desires or practices, can be a topic of debate. (shrink)

I am happy to comment on T S Petersen’s1 examination of the ‘individualization argument against non-medical egg freezing ’. Petersen intervenes in the ethical discussion on egg freezing by critically reconsidering a specific type of argument against oocyte cryopreservation for reasons that are not directly related with medical issues. Petersen dissects the claim that such non-medical usage is ‘an individualistic and morally problematic solution to the social problems that women face, for instance, in the labour market’.1 Proponents of this argument (...) believe that egg freezing should not be used by women on an individual level to solve social problems but that one should instead address gendered inequalities on the labour market. Petersen asserts that this individualisation argument is unconvincing—although morally appealing—because of empirically and ethically flawed assumptions. I am enthusiastic—with some minor reservations—about his unravelment of the individualisation argument and his call for more empirical backing. As I understand his presentation, the argument that is the subject of Petersen’s analysis is a recurring argumentative trope in the broader realm of assisted reproduction ethics. For instance, the anticipated positive effect of artificial womb technology in terms of liberation from reproductive and related social inequalities is one of the most dominant ectogenesis …. (shrink)

Should involuntarily childless people have the same opportunities to access parenthood as those who are not involuntarily childless? In the context of assisted reproductive technologies, affirmative answers to this question are often cashed out in terms of positive rights, including rights to third-party reproduction. In this paper, we critically explore the scope and extent to which any such right would hold up morally. Ultimately, we argue for a departure away from positive parental rights. Instead, we argue that the state has (...) an imperfect duty to benefit involuntarily childless people in relation to their parental aspirations. (shrink)

One of the most prominent justifications for the use of germline gene editing (GGE) is that it would allow parents to have a “genetically related child” while preventing the transmission of genetic disorders. However, we argue that since future uses of GGE may involve large-scale genetic modifications, they may affect the genetic relatedness between parents and offspring in a meaningful way: Due to certain genetic modifications, children may inherit much less than 50% of their DNA from each parent. We show (...) that the reduction in genetic relatedness between parents and offspring has three important social and legal implications. First, the desire for a genetically related child may end up not being the strong justification it is currently thought to be for the use of GGE. Second, prospective parents may be reluctant to use GGE because of a potential loss of genetic relatedness. Third, in some jurisdictions, parents who would not pass on “enough” DNA to their child may not be recognized as the child's legal parents. We further argue that the reduction in genetic relatedness challenges current conceptions of genetic parenthood that rely on the quantity of DNA shared with the child or on whether the child was directly derived from the parent's genes. We suggest that genetic parenthood should instead be determined based on the nature of the genetic modifications and whether the child's numerical identity has been preserved after the editing process. (shrink)

Following the Second Summit on Human Gene Editing in Hong Kong in 2018, where the birth of two girls with germline genome editing was revealed, the need for a responsible pathway to the clinical application of human germline genome editing has been repeatedly emphasised. This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion on research ethics issues in germline genome editing by exploring key issues related to the initial applications of CRISPR in reproductive medicine. Following an overview of the current (...) discussion on bringing germline genome editing into clinical practice, we outline the specific challenges associated with such interventions and the features that distinguish them from conventional clinical testing of new medical treatments. We then review proposed ethical requirements for initial heritable genome editing, such as the absence of reasonable alternatives, the existence of sufficient and reliable preclinical data, appropriate informed consent, requirements related to safety, and long-term follow-up. (shrink)

Almost all countries and fertility clinics impose age limits on women who want to become pregnant through Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART). Age limits for aspiring fathers, however, are much less common and remain a topic of debate. This article departs from the principle of reproductive autonomy and a conditional positive right to receive ART, and asks whether there are convincing arguments to also impose age limits on aspiring fathers. After considering three consequentialist approaches to justifying age limits for aspiring fathers, (...) we take in a concrete normative stance by concluding that those are not strong enough to justify such cut-offs. We reinforce our position by drawing a comparison between the case of a 39-year-old woman who wants to become a single mother via a sperm donor on the one hand, and on the other hand the same woman who wants to have a child with a 64-year-old man who she loves and who is willing to care for the child as long as he is able to. We conclude that, as long as appropriate precautions are taken to protect the welfare of the future child, couples who want to receive fertility treatment should never be limited on the basis of the age of the (male) partner. An absence of age limits for men would respect the reproductive autonomy of both the man and the woman. (shrink)

The aim of the study is to rethink the ethics of advanced motherhood. In the literature, delayed childbearing is usually discussed in the context of reproductive justice, and in relationship to ethical issues associated with the use and risk of assisted reproductive technologies. We aim to go beyond these more “traditional” ways in which reproductive ethics is framed by revisiting ethics itself through the lens of the figure of the so-called “older” mother. For this purpose, we start by exploring some (...) of the deep seated socio-cultural discourses in the context of procreation: ageism, ableism and the widespread bias towards geneticism and pronatalism. Afterwards, we provide a critical overview of the key arguments against or in support of advanced motherhood. We then briefly discuss how entrenchment by both sides has produced an impasse in the debate on the ethics of advanced motherhood and proceed by arguing that it is fundamental to bring about a change in this narrative. For this purpose, we will revisit the feminist usage of the concept of vulnerability which will allow us both to criticize culturally prescribed norms about motherhood and to address the painful reality of age-related fertility decline. In the last section, we argue that instead of defining “older” motherhood as an ethical problem, we should problematize the fact that female reproductive ageing is an understudied and ill-sourced topic. We believe that allocating resources to research to better understand female reproductive ageing is not only ethically permissible, but might even be ethically desirable. (shrink)