The main concern of this essay is to make a case for the thesis that Leibniz conceived of his philosophy as a way of life in something like the sense articulated in the works of Pierre Hadot. On this view, philosophy was a type of conduct, or a mode of existing‐in‐the‐world, which had to be practised at each instant, with the goal of transforming the whole of the individual’s life. The essay also serves as an introduction to some of the (...) main themes in Hadot’s work. While it includes a brief discussion of a number of the central components of Leibniz’s philosophy conceived as a way of life, the essay does not aim to do so in great detail. Rather, it offers a manifesto and initial road map. (shrink)

Commentators have long been fascinated by the problem of freedom in Leibniz's system. Many of the recent studies begin with Leibniz's views on modality, truth, and so-called superessentialism, and then investigate whether these doctrines are compatible with freedom and contingency. There is, however, another dimension to Leibniz's thinking about freedom that has been largely overlooked in the recent literature. ;Leibniz inherited a medieval debate about God's foreknowledge of and providence over human free actions, and unlike the other great philosophers of (...) the early modern period, set out to solve it. This means the problem of human freedom for Leibniz was nested in the larger problem of God's creation, preservation, and governance of the entire created order. ;In this dissertation I set out the late medieval debate and Leibniz's adjudication of it. I argue that Leibniz offers a strong notion of providence that is a via media between the two competing paradigms of the late seventeenth century, Molinism and Banezianism. In light of these theological commitments, I offer a new assessment of Leibniz's views of divine and human freedom. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I develop an interpretation of Leibniz on modality and free will. I do so for two reasons: first, I am attempting to revitalize the notion that Leibniz is the predecessor of contemporary modal semantics; second, I am using Leibniz's philosophical system to motivate responses to contemporary philosophical issues in modality and free will. In Chapter One, I argue that Leibniz's basic principles are plausible theoretical tools that ought to be used by contemporary philosophers in developing their philosophical (...) systems. In Chapter Two, I develop Leibniz's views on the nature of individuals. I argue that possible individuals are actually of the same sort as individuals in the actual world--possible individuals and actual individuals are complete creatures that do not differ ontologically from each other. In Chapter Three, I argue that Leibniz's views on possible individuals make him a modal realist and compare his view with contemporary modal realism in order to support this claim. I also argue that counterparts avoid many of the problems set for them by contemporary thinkers; I end with the ways that Leibniz's view differs from contemporary accounts. In Chapter Four, I argue that Leibniz provides two different analyses of modality. The first is an infinite analysis account; the second is a possible worlds account. I argue that these two accounts are compatible and amount to two different descriptions of the same theory of modality. I address objections to each account in order to show this. In Chapter Five, I argue that Leibniz is a compatibilist about free will. Importantly, I argue that it is precisely Leibniz's account of modality that allows for this compatibilism, as against a necessitarian like Spinoza. I then use Leibniz's account to challenge contemporary libertarians about free will on the basis of the principle of sufficient reason. I also show how Leibniz can help semicompatibilism avoid a worry concerning necessitarianism. At the end of the day, I claim that adopting elements of Leibniz's system can help us better understand modality and the freedom of the will and can be an aid in furthering contemporary philosophical theory. (shrink)