A specific type of collaboration has become prevalent in contemporary art: in this type of collaboration—henceforth, commissioning—an artist assigns the production of the work of art to skilled craftsmen or unskilled workers, directing their labor through instructions or blueprints. Commissioning has been accepted by the art world as a legitimate mode of artistic production—legitimate in the sense that it does not undermine the authenticity of the work as a creation of the artist, even if she has not laid a hand (...) for its production. Moreover, commissioning seems to be regarded as irrelevant to the nature of the work of art—specifically, to its artistic properties—and, thus, to its proper appreciation, as is.. (shrink)

I propose a minimal account of authorship that specifies the fundamental nature of the author-relation and its minimal domain composition in terms of a three-place causal-intentional relation holding between agents and sort-relative works. I contrast my account with the minimal account tacitly held by most authorship theories, which is a two-place relation holding between agents and works simpliciter. I claim that only my view can ground productive and informative principled distincitons between collective production and collective authorship.

In this paper, I argue that machines can create works of art. My argument is based on an analysis of the so-called creative machines and focuses on technical functions and intentions. If my proposal is correct, then creative machines are technical artifacts with the proper function to bring about works of art. My account is based on sensible conceptual connections between makers, technical artifacts, intentions, and the creation of art. One upshot of the account presented here is that we do (...) not need a new conceptual framework or dubious assumptions about artistic agency on part of machines in order to arrive at the conclusion that creative machines make art. I will conclude the paper with some remarks regarding the artistic value of items produced by creative machines. (shrink)

The dissertation explains the internet as an aesthetic medium, authorship in the medium and platforms’ influence on the medium’s aesthetic function. This is achieved by analysing the actual art that uses the internet as an aesthetic medium. The aesthetic function of the internet as a medium is different from its informative and communicative function. It entails manipulation of the medium defined by the permanent and instant interconnectedness of the digitalised instances or representations of people, things, artificial intelligence and information to (...) achieve a specific aesthetic aim. Internet as a medium, similarly to comics and film, allows for different kinds of authorship. A typical example of art that uses the internet as a medium is a meme. This is because memes involve meta-level discussions and group authorship, elements that are most easily facilitated by the internet as a medium. Art that uses the internet as an aesthetic medium can be single-authored if the sole author manipulates digital interconnectedness in an aesthetically significant way. Besides this general level of how the internet is characterised as a medium, there is a practical level that includes platforms on which artwork is made. These two levels are necessarily connected. Even though platforms also manipulate digitalised interconnectedness, they do not erase the internet’s potential as an aesthetic medium because artists manipulate this already manipulated content. (shrink)

Timbre is simultaneously one of the most powerfully immersive and one of the most ungraspable properties of music and musical aesthetics. And yet there is no critical idiom to assess timbre. There are not even adequate words to describe it, nor is there a definition that is more precise than one ex negativo: timbre is “the difference between two tones with the same pitch and volume”. The synonym “tone colour” is synesthetically muddled: it is a visual metaphor used to describe (...) an auditory phenomenon. This paper analyses the double dualism that pervades the musicological and critical assessment of tone colour. First, timbre is either considered in an idealist way as the expression of the inexpressible, or in a materialist way as the manipulation of sound waves and instruments. Second, there is disagreement as to whether timbre does or does not signify anything more specific than this “incommunicable”. Timbral dualism, however, separates matters that are – and cannot be but – inseparably entwined. Timbre is both an unstable object and an ungraspable Thing: in fact it resides in the space between those opposites. A theory of timbre, therefore, has to be inclusive rather than dualist: timbre bridges the gap between material origins and immaterial effects, between the ontology and the phenomenology of music. In this sense timbre epitomises the idealism/materialism debates in music epistemology. I argue that an inclusive theory of timbre would have to be based on vibration and vitality. Timbre is a vibration of sound waves crossing over from instruments to our listening bodies; a vibrating theory of timbre can cross over from ontology to phenomenology. The aesthetic experience of timbre is active and participatory : hearing timbre is interacting with musical epistemology itself. (shrink)