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  1. Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap.Jiafeng Zhu - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (3):290-312.
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  • A Utilitarian Account of Political Obligation.Brian Collins - 2014 - Dissertation, The University of Iowa
    One of the core issues in contemporary political philosophy is concerned with `political obligation.' Stated in an overly simplified way, the question being asked when one investigates political obligation is, "What, if anything, do citizens owe to their government and how are these obligations generated if they do exist?" The majority of political philosophers investigating this issue agree that a political obligation is a moral requirement to act in certain ways concerning political matters. Despite this agreement about the general nature (...)
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  • Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap.Jiafeng Zhu - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy (4):1-23.
    The moral principle of fairness or fair play is widely believed to be a solid ground for political obligation, i.e., a general prima facie moral duty to obey the law qua law. In this article, I advance a new and, more importantly, principled objection to fairness theories of political obligation by revealing and defending a justificatory gap between the principle of fairness and political obligation: the duty of fairness on its own is incapable of preempting the citizen‟s liberty to reciprocate (...)
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  • Reasons Beyond Reason? 'Political Obligation' Reconsidered.Glen Newey - 1996 - Philosophical Papers 25 (1):21--46.
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  • On the Value of Political Legitimacy.M. Coakley - 2011 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (4):345-369.
    Theories of political legitimacy normally stipulate certain conditions of legitimacy: the features a state must possess in order to be legitimate. Yet there is obviously a second question as to the value of legitimacy: the normative features a state has by virtue of it being legitimate (such as it being owed obedience, having a right to use coercion, or enjoying a general justification in the use of force). I argue that it is difficult to demonstrate that affording these to legitimate (...)
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