The poetic … would be that which you desire to learn, but from and of the other, thanks to the other and under dictation, by heart. Derrida, “Che cos’è la Poesia?” 227 I dare not pretend to be any...

I argue that Schelling’s construction of symbolic language is to be understood as an application of Naturphilosophie; indeed, more generally, that the concept of the symbol theorised anew in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Germany was predominantly a naturphilosophische concept, and its transfer into the discourses of aesthetics and ultimately linguistics was one instance of a broader project to understand aesthetic phenomena through the explanatory framework of naturalism. That is, Schelling is here understood as continuing a project of “aesthetic naturalism,” (...) which consists in the explanation of aesthetic phenomena naturalistically. In their theories of symbolic language, Schlegel and Schelling both extend such naturalistic accounts to the production of linguistic sense, and I go on to trace this Naturphilosophie of meaning through Schlegel’s 1801 Berlin lectures on aesthetics, Schelling’s lectures on the philosophy of art and into his later essays. (shrink)

This article is a semiotics-based attempt to explain artistic creativity of traditional East Asia and the Romantic West. Invoking the Greimas-Tarasti model, in which the modalities of “will,” “must,” “can,” and “know” are considered as a semiotic system, the author tries to examine how these modalities are manifested in discourses that define artistic subjectivities and actions. The concepts of the sublime and yūgen, authenticity and kokoro, formal communicational standards and kata, conventional beauty and hana are discussed side by side from (...) a comparative perspective. However, the article tries to reveal cultural creative patterns not so much in terms of qualitative difference as in terms of a particular configuration of a universal system. In the subject–object conjunction-oriented metaphysics of Buddhism and Confucianism, the immanent subjectivity is treated as constituted through the body and social mediation. For this reason, as we will see from the analysis of Nō theater performance principles, individual kokoro can hardly be distinguished from impersonal kata. In the Romantic paradigm, longing for an initial (or final) subject–object conjunction is expressed in the ideal of organic synthesis, and artistic creation is considered as the best manifestation of such synthesis. However, this conjunction functions in most cases as an immanent aesthetic vision, and symbols can hardly become the “complete representation of true spiritual life.”. (shrink)

O artigo procura avaliar a consolidação e os desdobramentos da função heurística e simbólica ocupada pelo Ungeheuer [o monstro ou o monstruoso] na filosofia kantiana, tendo em vista a emergência do horizonte da racionalidade moderna. Uma reconfiguração dessas imagens do Monstro e da Monstruosidade parece ter lugar no momento mesmo em que a filosofia moderna procurou pensar sua identidade e seus limites. O pensamento de Kant, que ocupa - de fato ou de direito - um lugar central nessa ruptura, apresentaria (...) de modo exemplar, embora não evidente, o percurso dessa transformação. This work intends to evaluate the origins and developments of the symbolic and heuristic function at stake in the term Ungeheuer [the monster or the monstrous] within Kant's philosophy, regarding the rising horizon of modern rationality. A reconfiguration of the Monster and Monstrous imagery seems to take place right at the moment when modern philosophy had to reflect upon its own identity and limits. Kant's thought, that occupies - de jure or de facto - a central place within this rupture could exemplarily, but not obviously, show the path of such transformation. (shrink)

Goethe and Friedrich Schiller stand together immortalised in Ernst Rietschel's statue at the centre of Weimar. In their lifetime, Goethe and Schiller shaped the culture of German-speaking lands, not only through their poetry, plays, and novels, but also in their role as editors of journals that helped to set the intellectual tone of the period. Schiller's journalDie Horen and Goethe'sPropyläen, although short-lived, were important literary vehicles of the period and provided a forum that brought scientists, historians, philosophers, and poets into (...) conversation with one another. The late 1700s and early 1800s were years of intense intellectual development in Germanspeaking lands; the arts flourished and aesthetics developed as a serious branch of philosophy.During the ‘Age of Goethe and Schiller’, philosophy was dominated by Kant's philosophy and its post-Kantian variations. A problem with traditional philosophical histories of this period is the overwhelmingly Hegelian reading of it, a reading that subsumes all of the so-called minor figures under the shadows of the great system builder, Hegel. Richard Kroner's influentialVon Kant bis Hegelof 1921 set the tone for this reading. Silenced by such narratives are the voices of the early German Romantics, a group of thinkers whose impudence created problems for them, and whose work posed hermeneutical challenges that continue to plague a proper understanding of the movement and the worth of its contributions. As we shall see, Hegel himself began to prepare the ground for a history of philosophy that would dismiss the contributions of the early German Romantics, a dismissal that is unfair and unfortunate: unfair because it is based on false characterisations of the movement, and unfortunate because such misreadings lead us to overlook the wealth of insights offered by the early German Romantics. (shrink)

In this essay, I survey the different uses of the concept of the symbol at play in the philosophy of religion. Considering that historically theories of the symbol have frequently had significant religious presuppositions and implications, I suggest that one might expect that the symbol would play a significant role in current research. This is not the case, however, since the very specific metaphysical, linguistic and theological premises that have traditionally informed much theorisation of the symbol tend to be unpopular (...) today. The main exception is Peircean symbolics which has recently been re-appropriated by a variety of philosophical fields, including philosophy of religion. To open up further contexts for contemporary deployments of the symbol, I look to contemporary public and legal debates concerning the right to wear religious symbols as an area of research unjustly neglected by philosophers of religion: much of the inchoate conceptual work being done in the legal cases themselves would naturally feed into academic philosophical discussion of the symbol. (shrink)

The poetic … would be that which you desire to learn, but from and of the other, thanks to the other and under dictation, by heart. Derrida, “Che cos’è la Poesia?” 227 I dare not pretend to be any...