In the last year there has been a great deal of public debate about homeopathy. The House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology concluded in November that there is no evidence base for homeopathy, and agreed with some academic commentators that homeopathy should not be funded by the NHS.i ii While homeopathic doctors and hospitals are quite commonplace, some might be surprised to learn that there are also many homeopathic dentists practicing in the UK. This paper examines some (...) of the claims made by homeopathic organisations regarding dentistry, and suggests that they may not be entirely ethical. (shrink)

In this article, I indicate and illustrate several flaws in a recent “ethical defence” of homeopathy. It transpires that the authors’ arguments have several features in common with homeopathic remedies, including strong claims, a lack of logic or evidence, and no actual effect.

Electroencephalography (EEG) neurofeedback is a type of biofeedback that purportedly teaches users how to control their brainwaves. Although neurofeedback is currently offered by thousands of providers worldwide, its provision is contested, as its effectiveness beyond a placebo effect is unproven. While scholars have voiced numerous ethical concerns about neurofeedback—regarding opportunity cost, physical and psychological harms, financial cost, and informed consent—to date these concerns have remained theoretical. This pilot study aimed to provide insights on whether these issues were supported by empirical (...) data from the experiences of neurofeedback users. Semi-structured telephone interviews were conducted with individuals who had used EEG neurofeedback for themselves and/or for a child. The majority of respondents (N = 36) were female (75%), white (92%), and of higher socioeconomic status relative to the U.S. population. Among adult users (n = 33), most (78.8%) resorted to neurofeedback after having tried other therapies, and were satisfied with the treatment (81.8%). The majority paid for neurofeedback out-of-pocket (72.7%) and considered it to be good value for money (84.8%). More than half (57.6%) considered neurofeedback to be a scientifically well-established therapy. However, of those, 78.9% were using neurofeedback for indications not adequately supported by scientific evidence. Concerns regarding opportunity cost, physical and psychological harms, and financial cost are not substantiated by our findings. Our results partially support concerns regarding insufficient understanding of limitations. This study underlines the disconnect between some of the theoretical concerns raised by scholars regarding the use of non-validated therapies and the lived experiences of users. (shrink)

The use of placebo in clinical practice has been the topic of extensive debate in the bioethics literature, with much scholarship focusing on concerns regarding deception. While considerations of placebo without deception have largely centred on open-label placebo, this paper considers a different kind of ethical quandary regarding placebo without an intent to deceive—one where the provider believes a treatment is effective due to a direct physiological mechanism, even though that belief may not be supported by rigorous scientific evidence. This (...) is often the case with complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) techniques and also with some mainstream therapies that have not proven to be better than sham. Using one such CAM technique as a case study—electroencephalography (EEG) neurofeedback for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)—this paper explores the ethics of providing therapies that may have some beneficial effect, although one that is likely due to placebo effect. First, we provide background on EEG neurofeedback for ADHD and its evidence base, showing how it has proven to be equivalent to—but not better than—sham neurofeedback. Subsequently, we explore whether offering therapies that are claimed to work via specific physical pathways, but may actually work due to the placebo effect, constitute deception. We suggest that this practice may constitute unintentional deception regarding mechanism of action. Ultimately, we argue that providers have increased information provision obligations when offering treatments that diverge from standard of care and we make recommendations for mitigating unintentional deception. (shrink)