In this paper, I present a new argument against inclusive legal positivism. As I show, any theory which permits morality to be a condition on legality cannot account for a core feature of legal activity, namely, that it is an activity of social planning. If the aim of a legal institution is to guide the conduct of the community through plans, it would be self-defeating if the existence of these plans could only be determined through deliberation on the merits. I (...) also argue that, insofar as inclusive legal positivism was developed as a response to Ronald Dworkin's critique of H. L. A. Hart's theory of law, it was founded on a mistake. For once we appreciate the role that planning plays in legal regulation, we will see that Dworkin's objection is based on a flawed conception of legal obligations and rights and hence does not present an objection that inclusive legal positivists were required to answer. (shrink)

This article addresses the question of whether judges can take the internal point of view towardtheir legal system's rule of recognition for purely prudential reasons. It takes a fresh look at an underappreciated conceptual argument of Joseph Raz's that answers: no. In a nutshell, Raz argues that purely prudential reasons are reasons of the wrong kind for judges to accept their legal system's rule of recognition. And should Raz's argument succeed, an important necessary connection between law and morality would be (...) established. (shrink)

El positivismo jurídico como teoría sobre la existencia del derecho: un comentario sobre Judging Positivism de Margaret Martin Este comentario examina de forma crítica la concepción de positivismo jurídico que informa el desafío planteado por Margaret Martin contra la substancia y el método de esta tradición intelectual. La afirmación central de este artículo es que su caracterización de la teoría substantiva del positivismo jurídico deja de lado una dimensión más fundamental, y explicativamente previa, relacionada a la teoría positivista de la (...) existencia de los sistemas y normas jurídicas. También sostengo que su caracterización de la metodología descriptiva del positivismo como un proyecto no normativo es demasiado exigente y no puede capturar la relaciones entre derecho y moral reconocidas por los positivistas contemporáneos ni la distinción entre preguntas internas y externas. Estas clarificaciones proporcionan recursos para comenzar a responder algunas de las objeciones de Martín contra el proyecto de Raz. (shrink)