Tibetan understandings about the bodies of spiritual teachers or lamas challenge the idea of a singular and bounded form. Tibetan Buddhists believe that the presence of the lama does not depend on their skin-encapsulated temporal body, or a singular lifespan. After death, it is not uncommon for a lama to materialize in other appearances or to become incorporated into the bodies of others through devotees’ consumption of their bodily remains. In this article, I discuss how the European ingestion of the (...) holy bodies of Tibetan lamas creates new possibilities for embodied intersubjectivity, and also how this practice repositions bodily substance in cannibal discourse. (shrink)

Rather than being a form of explicitly commodified reproduction, informal surrogacy is practiced (and interpreted) in a working-class community in Beijing as part of local affective life, viewed in terms of gifting, favors, filial piety, and family concerns. Through this practice a particular form of biopower, articulated in affective terms, limits some women to serving as instruments of reproduction. Unlike the common western assumption of a physical body as separate from the experiencing subject, the Chinese body has a subjective, experiential (...) dimension. This subjective body harbors an agency with the potential to transform the power exercised on it and to impact the circumstances of the surrogate’s life. I contextualize such agency in the analysis of the ambivalence of these women toward surrogacy and the violence of local kinship systems. Through analyzing how surrogates use their bodies to transform codes, forces and reform the self, the article suggests that informal surrogacy interacts and shapes local affective and political economies. (shrink)

This article examines discourse on immunity in general public engagements with pandemic influenza in light of critical theory on immuno-politics and bodily integrity. Interview and focus group discussions on influenza with members of the general public reveal that, despite endorsement of government advice on how to avoid infection, influenza is seen as, ultimately, unavoidable. In place of prevention, members of the general public speak of immunity as the means of coping with influenza infection. Such talk on corporeal life under microbial (...) threat is informed by self/not-self, network and ‘choice’ immunity, and therefore makes considerable allowance for cosmopolitan traffic with others, microbes, ‘dirt’ and immune-boosting consumer products. The immuno-political orientation of members of the general public, therefore, appears to trend towards a productive cosmopolitanism that contrasts with more orthodox bioscientific and governmental approaches to pandemic influenza. We reflect on the implications of the immuno-cosmopolitanism of everyday life for the advent of global public health emergency and for biopolitical rule in general. (shrink)

The field of human organ transplantation, and most particularly that of heart transplantation where the donor is always deceased, is one in which the rhetoric of hope leaves little room for any exploration or understanding of the more negative emotions and affects that recipients may experience. Where a donated heart is commonly referred to as the ‘gift of life’, both in lay discourse and by those engaged in transplantation procedures, how does this imbricate with the alternative clinical term of a (...) ‘graft’? For recipients of donor organs, the experience of living on in the face of otherwise certain death is fraught with complex emotions, not only about the self and the now dead other, but the persistence of the other within the self. In contrast to our expectations of the feel-good narrative of the gift of life, recipients are often significantly troubled by the aftermath of the procedure, which may fundamentally challenge notions of personal identity, as well as having deep implications for our understanding of the relation between death and ‘staying alive’. Drawing on recent research into heart transplantation, I shall theorise the field through a reflection – drawing on both Mauss and Derrida – on the meaning of the gift, before moving on to consider whether a Deleuzian approach to both the assemblage and the ‘event’ of death might offer a more productive framework. (shrink)

This article examines the temporality of organ transplantation with a focus on memoirs where the recipient has received an organ from a deceased donor. I argue that death constitutes life. That is, this absent presence – that the organ is materially present but the person is dead and therefore absent – is the foundation for rethinking relationality as constituted through the haunting presence of those who remain central to the continuity of life but who are not alive in any strict (...) definition of the term. This article is therefore attentive to the various meanings of haunting, drawing on queer theory to show how narratives of haunting are derealised experiences and thus a struggle for epistemological authority over specifically transplantation and relationality more broadly. It draws out how these epistemological challenges reimagine ontology as a haunted experience, and thus an intimate tie between the living and the unknown – and somewhat present – dead. (shrink)

The determination of death by neurological criteria (brain death) is practiced in at least 80 countries, though it is a matter of continuing controversy. At the same time, the brain is central to human life, thinking, and behavior; however, a growing “neurocentrism” or a brain‐focused image of human identity became established in most Western and in many non‐Western societies and acts as a forceful ideology. This paper seeks a broader theoretical and sociocultural basis to approaching death bioethically by analyzing criticisms (...) aimed at a neurologically focussed vision of human life, and then turning these towards the brain death criteria exposed to the criticism. The overall critique of the “neuro‐self” has scope to offer alternative perspectives to the contested issues in brain‐death criteria. Specifically, the paper examines two major shortcomings of a narrow brain view of life and culture. First, it considers the reduction of the individual to the brain: this is the crux of the neurological way of determining death, and is a way that is seemingly context‐independent and culturally neutral. Second, it considers how dimensions of society and culture for humans are detached from the brain and have little impact on clinical practice and thinking in brain‐death criteria; however, a deeper exploration reveals that they actually have direct relevance and that social and cultural factors have greater contributions to make to the current debates. (shrink)