Science is full of surprises. Fortunately, most of these surprises are small. A scientist, for example, might make an unexpected discoverey, but the discovery simply adds new data in support of an old theory. Or perhaps the discovery will endanger an existing theory, but one which has only local import. In cases like these, the existing theory will be modified, or perhaps even rejected; but the research tradition which surrounds the local theory will remain, by and large, unaffected and will (...) continue on.Small surprises are welcomed within science; they are part of the daily grist. Science needs them in order to advance in an orderly fashion. (shrink)

Many have claimed that split-brain patients are actually two persons. I maintain that both the traditional separation argument and the more recent sophistication argument for the two persons interpretation are inadequate on conceptual grounds. An autonomy argument is inadequate on empirical grounds. Overall, theoretical and practical consequences weigh heavily in favor of adopting a one person interpretation.

Many vertebrate animals approximate, to various degrees, the “split‐brain” condition that results from surgery done in humans to treat severe epilepsy, with very limited connection between the left and right sides of the upper parts of the brain. The split‐brain condition has been the topic of extensive philosophical discussion, because it appears, in some circumstances, to give rise to two minds within one body. Is the same true of these animals? This article attempts to make progress on two difficult topics—animal (...) experience, and the consequences of the human split‐brain condition—by considering both at once. (shrink)

Survival is the theory that some significant part of man continues after the death of his physical body. This dissertation studies philosophical argumentation of Christians and Buddhists, and analyzes the latest available empirical data, to determine which if any forms of survival are most probable. ;Part I finds insuperable difficulties in the purely materialistic resurrection theory, and in survival of disembodied minds as pure process. To make sense, resurrection must postulate either invisible bodies as conscious carriers of personal identity, or (...) a next world of Berkeleyan or Leibnizian idealism entered at death. ;Part II studies Buddhist views of survival. Early Buddhism proposes the alternatives of perpetual rebirth and transcendent nirvana. Pure Land Buddhism propounds objective idealist heavens accessible both in meditation and at death. Tibetan Buddhism further defends the mind-dependent nature of the intermediate state between rebirths. Thus Buddhism also requires either invisible bodies or an idealist next world. ;Part III examines empirical evidence indicative of survival: claimed memories of former lives; apparitions and out-of-body experiences ; and visions of dead people or other worlds at death . Questionable materials are discarded and evidence is presented with sample cases and experimental results. Alternative hypotheses are adduced to interpret the data. The evidence that NDE's are independent of culture and personality, and that some subjects have experiences while "brain dead," shows the falsity of the mind-brain identity theory, and is strongly indicative of survival. ;Part IV considers survival research as a case history of resistance to counter-paradigmatic scientific theories. Change and conservatism in science prove more dependent on sociological and psychological variables than on objective or logical grounds. The study concludes that at least some consciousnesses survive in ethereal or idealistic states, but broader generalization is dangerous without further empirical studies. (shrink)