This article focuses on the Platonic version of the doctrine of oikeiosis set forth by Piso in Cicero’s De finibus, Book V. The article aims to show that: 1) Cicero’s account, while clearly having Stoic features, is also consistent with the eudaemonistic character of Socrates’ and Plato’s ethics; 2) the replacement of oikeiosis with “assimilation to god”, attested in a passage of the Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus, derives from the intent to remove Epicurean egoistic connotations from Plato’s ethics; according (...) to the Anonymous, the Stoic oikeiosis alone would not suffice to attain this purpose. (shrink)

It is widely believed that the ancient Greeks thought that Thales was the first philosopher, and that they therefore maintained that philosophy had a Greek origin. This paper challenges these assumptions, arguing that most ancient Greek thinkers who expressed views about the history and development of philosophy rejected both positions. I argue that not even Aristotle presented Thales as the first philosopher, and that doing so would have undermined his philosophical commitments and interests. Beyond Aristotle, the view that Thales was (...) the first philosopher is attested almost nowhere in antiquity. In the classical, Hellenistic, and post-Hellenistic periods, we witness a marked tendency to locate the beginning of philosophy in a time going back further than Thales. Remarkably, ancient Greek thinkers most often traced the origins of philosophy to earlier non-Greek peoples. Contrary to the received view, then, I argue that (1) vanishingly few Greek writers pronounced Thales the first philosopher; and (2) most Greek thinkers did not even advocate a Greek origin of philosophy. Finally, I show that the view that philosophy originated with Thales (along with its misleading attribution to the Greeks in general) has roots in problematic, and in some cases manifestly racist, eighteenth-century historiography of philosophy. (shrink)

This article updates “The State of the Question in the Study of Plato” (Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1996) based on research covering the years from 1995–2015. Its three major parts examine: (1) how the mid‐twentieth‐century consensus has fared, (2) whether the new trends identified in that article have continued, and (3) identify trends either new or missed in the original article. On the whole, it shows the continuing decline of dogmatic and nondramatic Plato interpretation and the expansion and ramification of (...) the more literary, dramatic, and nondogmatic “new Platonism.” What was a growing insurgency twenty years ago can now be described as a, if not the, dominant approach. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that, in the re-emergence of Platonism as a dogmatic school of philosophy following the demise of the sceptical academy, Plato's works came to have an authoritative status. This paper argues for a particular understanding of what that authority consists in and how it was acquired.

This paper aims to show that the Middle Platonists’ appeal to the Timaeus was grounded in a complex and effective philosophical reasoning: the Middle Platonists conceived of Plato’s text as a web of passages which Plato himself had carefully established. Only a few of them were granted a qualified priority, namely, those offering a complete and comprehensive philosophical account of the key elements which the Platonists regarded as fundamental. This will allow us to show that the Middle Platonists’ preference for (...) the Timaeus does not depend on the fact that it is systematic. Rather it is systematic insofar as it proves capable of giving context to passages from other dialogues and provides them with an account that is philosophically sound. (shrink)

In his commentary on theTimaeus, the Neoplatonist Iamblichus argues that time is logically antecedent to change inasmuch as time is no mere aspect of change. Naturally, scholars appraise this thesis in light of Neoplatonic metaphysics. Nevertheless, they neglect the philological framing of this thesis, and thence the philosophical implications thereof. Only J.M. Dillon acknowledges this framing, though even Dillon does not acknowledge the philosophical implications thereof. This article illustrates the logic of said thesis vis-à-vis the Iamblichean exegesis ofTi. 38b7–c1 (Iambl.apudSimpl.in (...) Phys.1.794.21–7 Diels, Iambl.in Ti. fr. 67 Dillon). Beginning from the intuition that time is no mere aspect of change, Iamblichus argues that time can persist apart from change, and thereupon, given the Platonic notion that time is the everlasting image of Eternityquaparadigm, Iamblichus intuits that time is no mere image but everlasting in its own right, being itself a paradigm. Yet this thesis rests upon the indeterminateness of the Platonic titleτὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαιωνίας φύσεως(‘the paradigm of a thoroughly everlasting nature’) atTi. 38b8 and, still more so, upon the reflexiveness of the ambiguousΑΥΤΩΙ(that is,αὐτῷ‘toit[the paradigm]’, if notαὑτῷ‘toitself[as paradigm]’) atTi. 38c1. Inasmuch as the subject of the Platonic title is indeterminate between Eternity and Eternal Beingquaintelligible everlastingness, Iamblichus construesΑΥΤΩΙnot as a mere reflexive but as self-reflexive, withαὑτῷreferring to Timequaintelligible paradigm. In this light, the Platonic lemma grounds the Iamblichean thesis. (shrink)

Galen's stories about his successes in predicting the development of an illness belong to the best-known anecdotes drawn from his writings. Brilliant pieces of self-presentation, they set Galen apart from his peers, who tried to cover up their ignorance by levelling accusations of magic and divination against their superior colleague. These accusations are usually interpreted as very real threats, as Roman law punished illicit magic and divination. Pointing out that Galen sometimes likes to present himself as amantisand a prophet, others (...) have suggested that the accusations against Galen and his own self-presentation indicate that the border line between medicine and religion was still fluid. Both approaches correctly draw attention to the social reality that the accusations betray: they suggest that Galen belongs to a group of healers of dubious standing that populated the empire and thus show that medicine did not have a monopoly on healing. Yet such a socio-historical approach may not be sufficient. For one thing, both explanations have their limitations. Regarding the former, it can be said that Augustus' prohibition of divination aimed at controlling prediction about the emperor and one can doubt that a widespread clampdown of all forms of divination ever was intended. A possible objection to the second view is that throughout hisoeuvreGalen emphasizes his medicine as a rational undertaking, even as a science (epistêmê). If one takes his self-presentation as amantisto be more than metaphorical and to indicate the not yet fully crystallized identity of medicine as a separate scientific discipline, then Galen's usual way of understanding his own craft as a ‘science’ is in need of explanation. Besides such possible objections, a different set of questions still needs to be asked: why precisely were accusations of practising magic and divination levelled against Galen and why do they recur so frequently in his writings? Why divination and not, say, poisoning? (shrink)

L’article porte sur la façon dont Sextus, dans les derniers chapitres du Livre I des Esquisses pyrrhoniennes, répond aux argumentations qui tendent à rattacher le scepticisme à diverses philosophies plus anciennes. Après une étude de la nature et des sources de ces argumentations à partir du témoignage de Diogène Laërce et d’autres auteurs, et le constat que bien des questions à ce sujet ne peuvent que rester sans réponse, la majeure partie de l’article est consacrée à l’analyse des contre-arguments avancés (...) par Sextus. Dans presque tous les cas, il apparaît que Sextus s’oppose fermement à tout rapprochement du scepticisme avec d’autres philosophies. Cela est d’autant plus surprenant que la philosophie de l’Antiquité tardive manifeste une tendance marquée à se réclamer de prédécesseurs. L’attitude de Sextus s’explique par son désir de faire comprendre le plus clairement possible que le scepticisme, en réalité, n’a rien d’une philosophie au sens ordinaire du terme. La rareté, chez Sextus, des références à des prédécesseurs nommément désignés, y compris au sein de la tradition pyrrhonienne, peut aussi s’expliquer par le souhait de paraître complètement différent des philosophes tels qu’on les comprend habituellement. (shrink)