This study examines the degree of state ownership on corporate bribery. Integrating the theories of state ownership and corporate corruption, we propose that state ownership influences bribery propensity and bribery intensity in different ways; it lowers a firm’s tendency to pay bribes but increases the relative amount of bribery payment. Building on the control rights/bargaining hypotheses, we demonstrate that state ownership shields firms from bribery demands by reducing administrative hurdles that include bureaucratic requirements of obtaining licenses or settling taxes in (...) business operations. However, state ownership elevates the level of bribes by weakening their capital mobility. Using a sample of 23,018 firms from 54 countries covering 2006 to 2013, we find evidence to support our hypotheses. This article contributes to corruption research by drawing attention to an important channel of corruption and by highlighting the importance of considering not only the propensity but also the intensity of bribe payments. (shrink)