http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n1p53 Ratifying Haeckel and contradicting Kant’s negative prophesy, in this paper I try to show that Darwin was, really, the Newton of the blade of grass . Darwin showed how the configurations according to goals of the living beings, could be explained from a naturalistic point of view, without having to postulate the existence of an intentional agent that had arranged or prearranged then. This achievement, nevertheless, was obtained by a way that Kant could not foresee and that Haeckel could (...) not understand: Darwin came there showing that there was more natural science than that Newton, Kant and Haeckel could conceive. (shrink)

The British biologist, philosopher, and psychologist Conwy Lloyd Morgan is widely regarded as one of the founders of comparative psychology. He is especially well known for his eponymous canon, which aimed to provide a rule for the interpretation of mind from behavior. Emphasizing the importance of the context in which Morgan was working—one in which casual observations of animal behavior could be found in Nature magazine every week and psychology itself was fighting for scientific legitimacy—I provide an account of Morgan’s (...) vision for the comparative psychologist qua professional psychologist. To this end, I explore the important connection between Morgan and the evolutionary theorist, philosopher, and psychologist Herbert Spencer. It is from Spencer, I contend, that Morgan inherited a number of his key epistemological and methodological concerns about the nascent science of comparative psychology. This extends all the way to the canon, which only works as intended when paired with a Spencerian understanding of mental evolution as a progressive linear sequence. Far from being an incidental residue of a pre-Darwinian time, hierarchy was intentionally built into the very core of Morgan’s scientific comparative psychology. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction Darwin's Life Darwin's Darwinism Philosophical Problems with Darwin's Darwinism The Core Problems and Darwinism Conclusion References Further Reading.

The theoretical heuristic of assuming distinct alleles (or genotypes) for alternative phenotypes is the foundation of the paradigm of evolutionary explanation we call the Modern Synthesis. In modeling the evolution of sociality, the heuristic has been to set altruism and selfishness as alternative phenotypes under distinct genotypes, which has been dubbed the “phenotypic gambit.” The prevalence of the altruistic genotype that is of lower evolutionary fitness relative to the alternative genotype for non-altruistic behavior in populations is the basis of the (...) “paradox of altruism.” I show in this article that the assumption of contrasting genotypes for altruism and selfishness in our “phenotypic gambit” is inconsistent with the empirical data when viewed in the light of today’s post-Mendelian understanding of gene expression. I demonstrate that however nuanced and sophisticated the models may have become today, they are still rooted in that fundamentally problematic assumption. I then offer a genetic conception of altruism that best fits the field data. (shrink)

Darwinian evolution, as it was first conceived, has two dimensions: adaptation, that is, selection based upon “apt function”, defined as the “good fit” between an organism’s metabolic and biological demands and the environment in which it is embedded; and heredity, the transmissible memory of past apt function. Modern Darwinism has come to focus almost exclusively on hereditary memory, eclipsing the—arguably still-problematic—phenomenon of adaptation. As a result, modern Darwinism retains, at its core, certain incoherencies that, as long as they remain unresolved, (...) preclude the emergence of a fully-coherent theory of evolution. Resolving the incoherencies will involve clarifying the relationship between embodied memory and apt function. In short, adaptation is a problem of semiotics: the organism must interpret the environment to fit well into it. This is well-illustrated by the constructed environments built by colonies of social insects, such as hives or nests, and the ancillary structures that contain them, forming an organism-like system known as a superorganism. The superorganism is marked by a kind of extended physiology, in that these constructed environments often serve as adaptive interfaces between the nest and ambient environment, and are constructed to manage the matter and energy flows between environments that constitute the process of adaptation. These constructed environments are also semiotic phenomena: interpretive structures, governed by information flow between the member insects and the structures they build. I review our findings on one such example: the mounds built by the fungus-cultivating termites of the genus Macrotermes. These structures are dynamic forms that are sustained by flows of soil from deep horizons up into the mound. The form, and hence the function, of the mound is determined by several environmental cues, most notably water and wind, as well as how termites interpret these cues, and signals that flow between termites, both directly and vicariously through the structures they build. (shrink)

In The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, published in 1868, Darwin used the metaphor of the architect to argue in favor of natural autonomy and to clarify the role of chance in his theory of adaptive change by variation and natural selection. In this article, I trace the history of this important heuristic instrument in Darwin's writings and letters and suggest that this metaphor was important to Darwin because it helps him to explain the role of chance, and (...) gives an argument in favor of the free will. (shrink)

In evolutionary theory, we generally believe that the evolution of life is from simple to complex, from single to diverse, and from lower to higher. Thus, the idea of evolutionary progress appears obvious. However, in contemporary academic circles, some biologists and philosophers challenge this idea. Among them, Gould is the most influential. This paper first describes Gould’s seven arguments against evolutionary progress, i.e., the human arrogance argument, anthropocentric argument, no inner thrust argument, no biological base argument, extreme contingency argument, statistical (...) error argument, and bacteria (other than human beings) ruling the earth argument. Gould’s arguments against evolutionary progress have great influence in contemporary evolutionary theory. Thus, it is necessary to conduct a careful philosophical analysis of each of Gould’s arguments to reveal his philosophical mistakes. This research contends that Gould’s arguments against evolutionary progress are invalid. (shrink)

The notion of the ‘division of physiological labour’ is today an outdated relic in the history of science. This contrasts with the fate of another notion, which was so frequently paired with the division of physiological labour, which is the concept of ‘morphological differentiation.’ This is one of the elementary modal concepts of ontogenesis. In this paper, we intend to target the problems and causes that gradually led biologists to combine these two notions during the 19th century, and to progressively (...) dissociate them, retaining only the concept of differentiation by the early 20th century. We shall adhere to the following: 1. The primitive economic concept of the division of labour is not a descriptive notion denoting a type of organisation of labour, but an etiological one: the idea of a causal relationship between this type of organization and the improvement of the whole. 2. This concept rapidly interested naturalists such as Henri Milne-Edwards, who were keen to find a rational ground for hierarchizing living forms based on anatomical complexity. 3. The validation of this notion in the realms of biology was subject to at least two conditions which were far from being fully satisfied. This did not prevent, however, the initial success of the concept of the division of physiological labour during the second half of the 19th century. 4. Finally, the gradual disqualification, within the Darwinian theoretical context, of the conception of an intrinsic hierarchical rank of organisms, led to a lack of interest in the concept of the physiological division of labour, at least in its non-Darwinian and non-ecological variant (the link between the division of labour within an organism and organic perfection). (shrink)

The notion of the ‘division of physiological labour’ is today an outdated relic in the history of science. This contrasts with the fate of another notion, which was so frequently paired with the division of physiological labour, which is the concept of ‘morphological differentiation.’ This is one of the elementary modal concepts of ontogenesis. In this paper, we intend to target the problems and causes that gradually led biologists to combine these two notions during the 19th century, and to progressively (...) dissociate them, retaining only the concept of differentiation by the early 20th century. We shall adhere to the following: 1. The primitive economic concept of the division of labour is not a descriptive notion denoting a type of organisation of labour, but an etiological one: the idea of a causal relationship between this type of organization and the improvement of the whole. 2. This concept rapidly interested naturalists such as Henri Milne-Edwards, who were keen to find a rational ground for hierarchizing living forms based on anatomical complexity. 3. The validation of this notion in the realms of biology was subject to at least two conditions which were far from being fully satisfied. This did not prevent, however, the initial success of the concept of the division of physiological labour during the second half of the 19th century. 4. Finally, the gradual disqualification, within the Darwinian theoretical context, of the conception of an intrinsic hierarchical rank of organisms, led to a lack of interest in the concept of the physiological division of labour, at least in its non-Darwinian and non-ecological variant. (shrink)

The dominant view today on evolutionary progress is that it has been thoroughly debunked. Even value-neutral progress concepts are seen to lack important theoretical underpinnings: natural selection provides no rationale for progress, and natural selection need not even be invoked to explain large-scale evolutionary trends. In this paper I challenge this view by analysing how natural selection acts in heterogeneous environments. This not only undermines key debunking arguments, but also provides a selectionist rationale for a pattern of “evolutionary unfolding”, where (...) life radiates across an increased range of exploitation of environmental heterogeneity. (shrink)