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A Scientific-Realist Account of Common Sense

In Rik Peels & René van Woudenberg (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. pp. 333-351 (2020)

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  1. Why the Many-Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics needs more than Hilbert space structure.Meir Hemmo & Orly Shenker - 2020 - In Rik Peels, Jeroen de Ridder & René van Woudenberg (eds.), Scientific Challenges to Common Sense Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 61-70.
    McQueen and Vaidman argue that the Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics provides local causal explanations of the outcomes of experiments in our experience that is due to the total effect of all the worlds together. We show that although the explanation is local in one world, it requires a causal influence that travels across different worlds. We further argue that in the MWI the local nature of our experience is not derivable from the Hilbert space structure, but has (...)
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  • Observer Dependent Physicalism: A New Argument for Reductive Physicalism and for Scientific Realism.Meir Hemmo & Orly Shenker - 2023 - In Carl Posy & Yemima Ben-Menahem (eds.), Mathematical Knowledge, Objects and Applications: Essays in Memory of Mark Steiner. Springer. pp. 263-300.
    Reductive physicalism is a minority view in contemporary philosophy as well as in science, and therefore arguments for endorsing it often amount to arguments against the alternative views, in particular so-called non-reductive physicalism. In this paper we put forward a new argument for reductive physicalism, according to which it is the best account of the empirical data that we have. In particular, we show that: (a) a reductive physicalist theory of the mind forms an essential part of the very argument (...)
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