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  1. It’s common sense – you don’t need to believe to disagree!Miklós Kürthy, Graham Bex-Priestley & Yonatan Shemmer - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    It is often assumed that disagreement only occurs when there is a clash (e.g., inconsistency) between beliefs. In the philosophical literature, this “narrow” view has sometimes been considered the obvious, intuitively correct view. In this paper, we argue that it should not be. We have conducted two preregistered studies gauging English speakers’ intuitions about whether there is disagreement in a case where the parties have non-clashing beliefs and clashing intentions. Our results suggest that common intuitions tell against the default view. (...)
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  • Disagreement for Dialetheists.Graham Bex-Priestley & Yonatan Shemmer - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):192-205.
    Dialetheists believe some sentences are both true and false. Objectors have argued that this makes it unclear how people can disagree with each other because, given the dialetheist’s commitments, if I make a claim and you tell me my claim is false, we might both be correct. Graham Priest (2006a) thinks that people disagree by rejecting or denying what is said rather than ascribing falsehood to it. We build on the work of Julien Murzi and Massimiliano Carrara (2015) and show (...)
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