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Postmodernism and philosophy

In Steven Connor (ed.), The Cambridge companion to postmodernism. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 20--42 (2004)

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  1. Modernity, Post-Modernity and Proto-Historicism: Reorienting Humanity Through a New Sense of Narrative Emplotment.Andrew Kirkpatrick - 2014 - Cosmos and History 10 (2):22-77.
    As a grand narrative of progress, the utopian project of modernity is primarily concerned with notions of rationalism, universalism, and the development of a metalanguage. The triumph of the Moderate Enlightenment has seen logics of domination, accumulation and individualism incorporated into the project of modernity, with these logics giving rise to globalised capitalism as the metalanguage of modernity and neoliberal economics as the grand narrative of rational progress. The project of modernity is all but complete, requiring only the formality of (...)
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  • The power of social dreaming: Reappraising the lesson of East European dissidents.Urszula Terentowicz-Fotyga - 2018 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 51 (3):346-355.
    In the article, Thomas More’s vision of citizen education is a starting point for the analysis of the role of East European dissident thought and practice in addressing the present crisis of social agency posed by the legacy of postmodern philosophy and the surge of post-truth politics. The article argues that engaging with the experience of Eastern Europe in the last decades of the twentieth century offers a useful way of approaching the question of political action in relation to social (...)
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  • Postmodernism, Quietism, and Philosophy.David E. Cooper - 2024 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 32 (1):45-58.
    In my 1993 IJPS paper it was suggested that postmodernist verdicts on ‘the death of philosophy’ relied on a rejection of any ‘substantive’ or ‘metaphysical’ notion of truth. The present paper relates these verdicts to Wittgenstein’s alleged ‘philosophical quietism’. In both cases, for example, there is a rejection of ‘depth’. Various characterisations of Wittgenstein’s position are questioned, including the idea that his quietism consists in showing the impossibility of sceptical challenges to our ‘hinge’ propositions and beliefs. It is then argued, (...)
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