There is a well-documented paradigm-shift in eighteenth century Jesuit philosophy and science, at the very least in Central Europe: traditional scholastic version(s) of Aristotelianism were replaced by early modern rationalism (Wolff's systematisation of Leibnizian philosophy) and early modern science and mathematics. In the field of probability, this meant that the traditional Jesuit engagement with probability, uncertainty, and truthlikeness (in particular, as applied to moral theology) could translate into mathematical language, and can be analysed against the background of the accounts of (...) probability, pre-mathematical Jesuit logic, Wolff's conceptual analysis, and Bernoullian mathematisation. The works of two Jesuit philosophers, Berthold Hauser and Sigismund Storchenau, can be related to this context. The core of their logic of (epistemic) probability is the account of negation (or ‘contradiction’) and implication (or ‘argument’), in particular, the algorithms for computing the reliability of one piece of evidence when compared to the respective counter-evidence and for computing the probability of a conclusion given the probability of its premises. (shrink)

This paper analyses a kinematic model for the solar motion by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, a thirteenth-century Iranian astronomer at the Marāgha observatory in northwestern Iran. The purpose of this model is to account for the continuous decrease of the obliquity of the ecliptic and the solar eccentricity since the time of Ptolemy. Shīrāzī puts forward different versions of the model in his three major cosmographical works. In the final version, in his Tuḥfa, the mean ecliptic is defined by an eccentric (...) of fixed mean eccentricity and a mean obliquity fixed with respect to the celestial equator, and the center of the epicycle, which is inclined to the eccentric, moves on the eccentric with an annual period. By an additional slow motion of the sun on the epicycle, the true eccentricity of the solar deferent, defined by the annual motion of the sun, and the sun’s extreme declination from the equator change, accounting for the reduction of the eccentricity and the obliquity of the ecliptic since the time of Ptolemy. (shrink)

In this paper, I compare Pierre-Simon Laplace's celebrated formulation of the principle of determinism in his 1814 Essai philosophique sur les probabilités with the formulation of the same principle offered by Roger Joseph Boscovich in his Theoria philosophiae naturalis, published 56 years earlier. This comparison discloses a striking general similarity between the two formulations of determinism as well as certain important differences. Regarding their similarities, both Boscovich's and Laplace's conceptions of determinism involve two mutually interdependent components—ontological and epistemic—and they are (...) both intimately linked with the principles of causality and continuity. Regarding their differences, however, Boscovich's formulation of the principle of determinism turns out not only to be temporally prior to Laplace's but also—being founded on fewer metaphysical principles and more rooted in and elaborated by physical assumptions—to be more precise, complete and comprehensive than Laplace's somewhat parenthetical statement of the doctrine. A detailed analysis of these similarities and differences, so far missing in the literature on the history and philosophy of the concept of determinism, is the main goal of the present paper. (shrink)