In rebellion against low‐dimensional (e.g., two‐factor) theories in psychology, the authors make the case for high‐dimensional theories. This change in perspective requires a shift towards a focus on computation and quantitative reasoning.

Parmi les différents types d’implicite, les implicatures portent sur le niveau du contenu, les présuppositions et les topicalisations sur le niveau de la responsabilité, en provoquant ce que Givón appelle la unchallengeability d’une information, c’est-à-dire la difficulté pour le destinataire d’y appliquer un “défi” cognitif qui puisse aboutir au doute sur sa vérité. Cette fonction des implicites se trouve de façon massive dans les textes persuasifs. L’article vise à quantifier l’implicitation du contenu et de la responsabilité dans quelques textes de (...) propagande politique et commerciale, au moyen d’un système d’indices d’implicitation assignés aux dites catégories. On propose ce procédé comme un exemple du rôle que l’analyse linguistique peut jouer pour l’amélioration des conditions de transparence et de garantie dans la pratique de la communication commerciale, et dans les processus où se forme le consentement démocratique. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss phenomenological and logical characteristics of skilled behaviour in sport. The paper comprises two parts. The first describes phenomenological characteristics of skilled behaviour through Timothy Gallwey’s two playing modes and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between abstract and concrete movement. The second logical part introduces the concept of intentionality and the distinction Sean Kelly makes between cognitive and motor intentionality. I discuss how this distinction fits the phenomenological characteristics established in the first part of the paper. My argument (...) is that the logical structure of cognitive intentionality fits phenomenological characteristics of abstract movement, whereas the logical structure of motor intentionality fits phenomenological characteristics of concrete movements. (shrink)

Human attention is limited in its capacity and duration. In language, this is manifested in many ways, but more conspicuously in the strategies by which information is distributed in utterances, that is, their information structures. We contend that the pragmatic categories of Topic and Presupposition precisely meet the necessity to modulate attentional resources on sentence contents, and they do this by “directing” certain contents to automatic and others to controlled processing mechanisms. We discuss experimental findings suggesting that presupposed or topicalized (...) information correlates with automatic processing, and we suggest that this association grounded for the emergence of topic and presupposition units in human communication. We also put forth the processing automaticity induced by these units as the rationale behind their persuasiveness in some specific contexts of language use. (shrink)

Existing models of mindfulness describe the self-regulation of attention as primary, leading to enhanced decentering and ability to access and override automatic cognitive processes. This study compared 23 experienced and 21 non-meditators on tests of mindfulness, attention, decentering, and ability to override automatic cognitive processes to test the cognitive mechanisms proposed to underlie mindfulness practice. Experienced meditators had significantly higher mindfulness and decentering than non-meditators. No significant difference between groups was found on measures of attention or ability to override automatic (...) processes. These findings support the prediction that mindfulness leads to enhanced decentering, but do not support the cognitive mechanisms proposed to underlie such enhancement. Since mindfulness practice primarily involves internally directed attention, it may be the case that cognitive tests requiring externally directed attention and timed responses do not accurately assess mindfulness-induced cognitive changes. Implications for the models of mindfulness and future research are discussed. (shrink)