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How Much Common Belief is Necessary for Convention?

In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.), The logic of strategy. New York: Oxford University Press (1999)

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  1. Conditionalization and not Knowing that One Knows.Aaron Bronfman - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (4):871-892.
    Bayesian Conditionalization is a widely used proposal for how to update one’s beliefs upon the receipt of new evidence. This is in part because of its attention to the totality of one’s evidence, which often includes facts about what one’s new evidence is and how one has come to have it. However, an increasingly popular position in epistemology holds that one may gain new evidence, construed as knowledge, without being in a position to know that one has gained this evidence. (...)
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  • Convention.Michael Rescorla - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The central philosophical task posed by conventions is to analyze what they are and how they differ from mere regularities of action and cognition. Subsidiary questions include: How do conventions arise? How are they sustained? How do we select between alternative conventions? Why should one conform to convention? What social good, if any, do conventions serve? How does convention relate to such notions as rule, norm, custom, practice, institution, and social contract? Apart from its intrinsic interest, convention is important because (...)
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  • Approximate common knowledge and co-ordination: Recent lessons from game theory. [REVIEW]Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - 1997 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 6 (2):171-90.
    The importance of the notion of common knowledge in sustaining cooperative outcomes in strategic situations is well appreciated. However, the systematic analysis of the extent to which small departures from common knowledge affect equilibrium in games has only recently been attempted.We review the main themes in this literature, in particular, the notion of common p-belief. We outline both the analytical issues raised, and the potential applicability of such ideas to game theory, computer science and the philosophy of language.
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