L'A. défend la thèse selon laquelle Wittgenstein développe une conception pragmatique et linguistique des relations internes qui définissent les vérités nécessaires: 1) qui n'implique pas l'analyticité de toutes les propositions exprimant des relations internes, 2) qui établit une distinction entre l'analytique et le synthétique, 3) qui s'avère compatible avec la critique de l'analyticité entreprise par Quine.

This paper is a response to Prof. B. Sambasiva Prasad’s paper, entitled ‘Wittgenstein’s Criticism of Moore’s Propositions of Certainty: Some Observation’ published in this journal, Volume XX, Number-3, July–September 2003. The objective of Prasad’s paper, as he puts it, is to examine Wittgenstein’s criticism of the propositions of certainty which Moore has made in his essays ‘A Defence of Common Sense’ and ‘Proof of an External World’ with the twin aims of refuting idealism and skepticism and upholding common sense realism. (...) But, a close reading of Prasad’s paper reveals that its main agenda is to defend Moore by justifying his propositions and the realist project as a whole against Wittgenstein’s attack of them in On Certainty. The objective of my paper is to argue that Prasad’s defence of Moore is untenable, since he has tried to side with him without fully comprehending the logic behind Wittgenstein’s criticism of him. Prasad has sought to justify Moore’s propositions and his realism without taking into account Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language and his conception of proposition, meaning, knowledge, certainty and doubt. My paper is also an attempt at asserting that Wittgenstein’s analysis of the problem of scepticism and the existence of the world and the ‘resolution’ thereof is more profound than those offered by Moore. It seeks to affirm Wittgenstein’s radical remark that the idealists are demented in doubting the existence of the world and the realists are doubly demented in trying to refute the idealists and prove the existence of the world of physical objects. The paper embodies my justification of Wittgenstein’s criticism of Moore on the four important issues with reference to which Prasad has tried to uphold Moore. It constitutes my objections to the observations and arguments which Prasad has made by way of defending Moore and denouncing Wittgenstein on these issues. The issues are the nature of Moore’s propositions; Moore’s use/misuse of the expression ‘I know’; Moore’s and Wittgenstein’s approach to idealism/scepticism; and their world-views. (shrink)