This chapter presents a detailed explanation of Peirce’s early and late views on semiotic indeterminacy and then considers how those views might be applied within biosemiotics. Peirce distinguished two different forms of semiotic indeterminacy: generality and vagueness. He defined each in terms of the “right” that indeterminate signs extend, either to their interpreters in the case of generality or to their utterers in the case of vagueness, to further determine their meaning. On Peirce’s view, no sign is absolutely determinate, i.e., (...) every sign is indeterminate to at least some degree and so exhibits some degree of generality or vagueness. If Peirce was right about this, then no instance of biosemiosis is completely determinate—every biosign must be general or vague to some degree. I show that on Peirce’s view, whether a sign is general or vague depends on its immediate object, “the idea which the sign is built upon,” and I explain how Peirce would go about identifying the immediate object of a sign lacking both a minded utterer and a minded interpreter—an identification that must be possible if any biosign is indeterminate. (shrink)

The problem of the status of metaphysics -- what it is and what it is for, what use it is - has been with us for millennia, at least since Plato took issue with the Sophists, and continues to the present day. Here I attempt an intervention in this perennial dispute, with the aim of providing some kind of rapprochement between the factions. This intervention is based on how Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) understood metaphysics and the position presented here is (...) thus called `Peircean realism'. The basic idea is that everyone has a metaphysics and has to have one, just to get by in everyday life, and this is no different for scientific inquirers in their professional work. The subject matter of metaphysics is thus presuppositions, whether it is what we rely on to go shopping or to discover the Higgs boson. We rely on these in our activities and expect them to have an effect on outcomes, so when our expectations are frustrated, doubt may be thrown on our presuppositions. We would thus like the ability to inquire into our presuppositions so as not to repeat mistakes, but our instinctive, evolved capacity for reasoning may not be up the job, since it is entwined with what we take for granted. Instead, Peirce develops a science of good reasoning that includes a theory of inquiry, which would allow us to scrutinise our presuppositions, to perform metaphysical inquiry. The starting point for this science of good reasoning is basic principles of combination and organisation, because these are involved in all activity, and these are Peirce's categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. This is also where I start in the exposition of and argument for Peircean realism as a scientific -- that is, truth-directed -- metaphysics that provides the best possible general presuppositions to the natural and human sciences, the special sciences that deal with matters in their particularity; that Peircean realism is a viable metaphysics for those sciences. This exposition and argument comprises the first part of this thesis. In the second part, the case for Peircean realism is further bolstered by turning a critical eye on positions that are deficient from the Peircean point of view, in that they lack one or other category and thus starve the special sciences of the resources they need, or that they try to ignore metaphysics entirely. All this is meant to demonstrate that metaphysics is unavoidable, that we need all three of Peirce's categories for a viable metaphysics for the special sciences, and that Peircean realism is just such a metaphysics. (shrink)

The first part of this essay provides an analysis of the text “The Law of Mind”, in which Peirce theorizes about the power of growth and spreading of ideas and also presents his response to the classic question about how mind can influence matter. We intended to show, from an analysis focused on the dual semantic meaning of the word “ affect ”, how the author’s rupture with the Cartesian dualism between mind and matter implies in a substantial identity between (...) ideality and reality by means of a metaphysical merging of realism and idealism, where matter is taken to be only a special case of mind . The second part shows how the forms of evolutionism are drawn from the three categories, highlighting the agapism, the doctrine of cosmic and creative love. Finally, we shall argue on how the association between realism and idealism, as well as the considerations of the author’s evolutionism, constitute vital aspects for the justification of the historical success of our human capacity for conjecturing, viz., for proposing successful hypothesis to explain the facts. (shrink)

Two different versions of the ending of the first additament to C. S. Peirce's 1908 article, "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," appear in the Collected Papers but were omitted from The Essential Peirce. In one, he linked the hypothesis of God's Reality to his entire theory of logic as semeiotic, claiming that proving the latter would also prove the former. In the other, he offered a final outline of his cosmology, in which the Reality of God as (...) Ens necessarium is indispensable to both the origin and order of our existing universe of Signs. Exploring these passages, as well as the unpublished manuscript drafts of the article, provides important insights into the key concepts of instinct and continuity within Peirce's comprehensive system of thought. (shrink)

This essay is an attempt to explain why Charles Sanders Peirce’s evolutionary metaphysics would not have seemed strange to its original 1890s audience. Building on the pioneering work of Andrew Reynolds, I will excavate the scientific context of Peirce’s Monist articles—in particular “The Law of Mind” and “Man’s Glassy Essence,” both published in 1892—focusing on the relationship between protoplasm, evolution, and consciousness. I argue that Peirce’s discussions should be understood in the context of contemporary evolutionary and physiological speculations, many of (...) which were featured in late- 1880s issues of Open Court, sister journal to the Monist. (shrink)

For William Whewell and, later, Charles Peirce, the methods of science merited scientific examination themselves. Looking to history to build an inductive account of the scientific process, both men transformed scientific methods into scientific evidence. What resulted was a peculiar instance of what Ian Hacking calls “the looping effects of human kinds,” in which classifying human behavior changes that behavior. In the cases of Whewell and Peirce, the behavior in question was their own: namely, scientific study. This essay brings Hacking’s (...) formulation to bear on the status of science in nineteenth-century intellectual history, revealing the continued entanglement of science and philosophy even as they were being prized apart. Focusing on how Whewell and Peirce turned themselves into “scientific kinds,” the essay reveals the slippage between “what” and “how” across what Peirce once called “the age of methods.”. (shrink)

The prevalent idea that semiosis is evolutionary is a driving point for biosemiotic research, starting from the Peircean premises of continuity and including a large number of views on how signs evolve. In this paper I wish to add a small pinch of skepticism to an otherwise productive point of view. Briefly, the question to be asked is: Is there any proper and fair connection between the logical abstraction of signs, genetic expressions interpreted as signs and the animal usage of (...) signs? And how do we go about answering this? Instead of attempting a negative account of the possibility of an evolutionary view of biosemiosis, I will attempt to make an argument in favor of skepticism as a way to make a more fine-grained distinction across the areas where biosemiotic thinking seems to have some impact. The aim is then to find philosophical strategies to overcome this skepticism when possible, while also raising some awareness about the possible limits of current biosemiotics regarding the ideal evolutionary chain of signs. Ultimately, the idea is reexamining some core assumptions of the biosemiotic point of view at its most general, accounting for some possible ways in which theory may move forward. The potential incompatibility of theoretical standpoints between some of the different approaches that may be taken is, it will be argued, a desirable outcome for biosemiotic research. That is, the way we deal with the possible theories on the evolutionary continuity of signs will also affect our different research programs, and having a nuanced philosophical discussion on it can only contribute to the expansion and clarification of where different positions within biosemiotics currently stand. (shrink)

У статті розглядаються основні ідеї метафізики видатного американського логіка та філософа Чарльза Пірса. Показано, що значну частину його «наукової метафізики» становить еволюційна космологія, що характеризується, зокрема, істотною роллю випадковості у світі. Серед інноваційних ідей еволюційної космології вирізняється ідея хаотичного початку Універсуму. У статті показано, що ця ідея перегукується з деякими сучасними проблемами квантово-релятивістської космології, і насамперед із проблемами, як і раніше, популярної «інфляційної моделі», в якій ідея хаотичного початку еволюції Всесвіту є однією з центральних.Метою цієї статті є визначення низки паралелей (...) між «науковою метафізикою» Пірса та інфляційними космологічними моделями.Методом дослідження є проведення порівняльного аналізу сценарію еволюції Всесвіту з еволюційної космології Пірса – з одного боку, та сценарію еволюції Всесвіту в інфляційній моделі – з іншого боку, на основі виявлення загального елемента обох сценаріїв хаотичного початку еволюції Всесвіту. В результаті були виявлені зазначені вище паралелі.У першому підрозділі «Детермінізм та «наукова метафізика» Ч. Пірса» коротко відзначені ті філософські течії, які найбільше вплинули на формування та еволюцію поглядів Пірса. Розглянуто деякі загальні питання детермінізму як філософської течії про впорядкованість у світі. Зокрема, також розглянуто питання про співвідношення необхідності та випадковості у детермінізмі, а також трактування Пірса про співвідношення цих категорій. Докладно описано задум Пірса побудувати «наукову метафізику» як альтернативу її традиційним версіям.У другому підрозділі «Еволюційна космологія в «науковій метафізиці» Пірса» обговорюється зміст його еволюційної космології як найважливішої складової його «наукової метафізики». Акцент робиться на процесі еволюції Всесвіту від її початкового хаотичного стану. Ставиться питання про нетрадиційний стосовно механістичної картині світу підхід до природи випадковості. Суть нетрадиційного немеханістичного розуміння випадковості у процесі еволюції пов’язана з конструктивним її розумінням.Третій підрозділ «Тихізм Пірса та сучасна космологія» присвячений опису зв’язку «наукової метафізики» Пірса та сучасної квантово-релятивістської космології. Дається короткий опис еволюції сучасної квантово-релятивістської космології та становлення в її рамках інфляційних моделей. Також коротко дається її зміст та аналіз сценарію еволюції Всесвіту, починаючи з хаотичного стану.Знайдені паралелі сприятимуть поглибленню наукової картини світу, зокрема – прогресивному впливу конструктивного розуміння випадковості, особливо в еволюційних процесах.У такому контексті представлені паралелі здійснені, наскільки нам відомо, вперше як у вітчизняній, так і в зарубіжній літературі. (shrink)

Para la estética, la creatividad es la emergencia del instante que la vuelve irrepetible o un transitar pendular que la hace resurgir como reminiscencia cegada por un ocaso repetitivo. Haciendo coincidir proceso y teleología, Peirce aglutina estas dos dimensiones, sin atisbar realmente un atisbo de humanidad para disfrutar de lo ínfimo. De ahí que propongamos un momento oportuno que nos dirija hacia una temporalidad más humana.

This study aims at a better understanding of Peirce’s conception of a philosophy of history. Peirce has a well defined place for historiography in his classification of the sciences, but what he has to say about history as a philosopher is not primarily referring to it as a form of historiographic knowledge, but to history as a process and a medium. As a process, history is, fundamentally, a cooperative activity of man resulting in civilization and capable of varying categoriological degrees (...) of directionality that reflect the ‘agents’ knowledge’ of history incorporated in the communicative practices of their community. As a medium, history – in the light of the cosmogonic narrative of Peirce’s evolutionary metaphysics and of his mature conception of the summum bonum – is one of two forms of expression of the Absolute. Our paper studies the development of these conceptions from the Schellingian influences on “The Place of Our Age in the History of Civilization” (1863), to “Fixation of Belief” (1877) and “Evolutionary Love” (1892). Throughout this development, Peirce remains primordially interested in the philosophy of history as a mode of normatively conceiving of history (as a medium) in a way that enables us to pragmatically project our cultural development as a process in which an increasing control over our own history is actualized. (shrink)