In this paper we re-assess the philosophical foundation of Exactly True Logic ($$\mathcal {ET\!L}$$ ET L ), a competing variant of First Degree Entailment ($$\mathcal {FDE}$$ FDE ). In order to do this, we first rebut an argument against it. As the argument appears in an interview with Nuel Belnap himself, one of the fathers of $$\mathcal {FDE}$$ FDE, we believe its provenance to be such that it needs to be taken seriously. We submit, however, that the argument ultimately fails, (...) and that $$\mathcal {ET\!L}$$ ET L cannot easily be dismissed. We then proceed to give an overview of the research that was inspired by this logic over the last decade, thus providing further motivation for the study of $$\mathcal {ET\!L}$$ ET L and, more generally, of $$\mathcal {FDE}$$ FDE -related logics that result from semantical analyses alternative to Belnap’s canonical one. We focus, in particular, on philosophical questions that these developments raise. (shrink)

Shramko [. Truth, falsehood, information and beyond: The American plan generalized. In K. Bimbo, J. Michael Dunn on information based logics, outstanding contributions to logic...

In this paper, we study logical systems which represent entailment relations of two kinds. We extend the approach of finding ‘exactly true’ and ‘non-falsity’ versions of four-valued logics that emerged in series of recent works [Pietz & Rivieccio (2013). Nothing but the truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 42(1), 125–135; Shramko (2019). Dual-Belnap logic and anything but falsehood. Journal of Logics and their Applications, 6, 413–433; Shramko et al. (2017). First-degree entailment and its relatives. Studia Logica, 105(6), 1291–1317] to the case (...) of infectious logics, namely to the case of Deutsch's logic Sfde introduced in Deutsch [Relevant analytic entailment. The Relevance Logic Newsletter, 2(1), 26–44; The completeness of S. Studia Logica, 38(2), 137–147]. The particular systems obtained in this way are Setl and Snfl. We present them in the form of sequent calculi and prove corresponding soundness and completeness theorems. We illuminate the connection between Setl, Snfl and two well-known systems, strong Kleene three-valued logic K3 and Priest's Logic of Paradox LP. This connection allows us to investigate the characterisation of the entailment relations associated with Setl and Snfl as well as to introduce the notion of ‘infectious analogue’ of a certain logic. We also study implicative extensions of Setl and Snfl and prove soundness and completeness theorems for them as well. (shrink)

Structural reasoning is simply reasoning that is governed exclusively by structural rules. In this context a proof system can be said to be structural if all of its inference rules are structural. A logic is considered to be structuralizable if it can be equipped with a sound and complete structural proof system. This paper provides a general formulation of the problem of structuralizability of a given logic, giving specific consideration to a family of logics that are based on the Dunn–Belnap (...) four-valued semantics. It is shown how sound and complete structural proof systems can be constructed for a spectrum of logics within different logical frameworks. (shrink)

In this paper we present a solution of the axiomatization problem for the Fmla-Fmla versions of the Pietz and Rivieccio exactly true logic and the non-falsity logic dual to it. To prove the completeness of the corresponding binary consequence systems we introduce a specific proof-theoretic formalism, which allows us to deal simultaneously with two consequence relations within one logical system. These relations are hierarchically organized, so that one of them is treated as the basic for the resulting logic, and the (...) other is introduced as an extension of this basic relation. The proposed bi-consequences systems allow for a standard Henkin-style canonical model used in the completeness proof. The deductive equivalence of these bi-consequence systems to the corresponding binary consequence systems is proved. We also outline a family of the bi-consequence systems generated on the basis of the first-degree entailment logic up to the classic consequence. (shrink)

In this paper we present a solution of the axiomatization problem for the Fmla-Fmla versions of the Pietz and Rivieccio exactly true logic and the non-falsity logic dual to it. To prove the completeness of the corresponding binary consequence systems we introduce a specific proof-theoretic formalism, which allows us to deal simultaneously with two consequence relations within one logical system. These relations are hierarchically organized, so that one of them is treated as the basic for the resulting logic, and the (...) other is introduced as an extension of this basic relation. The proposed bi-consequences systems allow for a standard Henkin-style canonical model used in the completeness proof. The deductive equivalence of these bi-consequence systems to the corresponding binary consequence systems is proved. We also outline a family of the bi-consequence systems generated on the basis of the first-degree entailment logic up to the classic consequence. (shrink)

I offer here a critical assessment of Beall and Ficara’s most recent take on Hegelian contradictions. By interpreting differently some key passages of Hegel’s work, I favor, unlike them, a no-gaps approach which leads to a different logic.

In this work, we propose a variant of so-called informational semantics, a technique elaborated by Voishvillo, for two infectious logics, Deutsch’s |${\mathbf{S}_{\mathbf{fde}}}$| and Szmuc’s |$\mathbf{dS}_{\mathbf{fde}}$|⁠. We show how the machinery of informational semantics can be effectively used to analyse truth and falsity conditions of disjunction and conjunction. Using this technique, it is possible to claim that disjunction and conjunction can be rightfully regarded as such, a claim which was disputed in the recent literature. Both |${\mathbf{S}_{\mathbf{fde}}}$| and |$\mathbf{dS}_{\mathbf{fde}}$| are formalized in (...) terms of natural deduction. This allows us to solve several problems: to develop a natural deduction calculus for |${\mathbf{S}_{\mathbf{fde}}}$| containing the standard form of disjunction elimination (in contrast to the calculus by Petrukhin), to introduce the first natural deduction calculus for |$\mathbf{dS}_{\mathbf{fde}}$| and to reflect the fundamental symmetry between |${\mathbf{S}_{\mathbf{fde}}}$| and |$\mathbf{dS}_{\mathbf{fde}}$| on proof-theoretical level forming a convenient basis for obtaining their well-known extensions |$\mathbf{K}^{\mathbf{w}}_{\mathbf{3}}$| and |$\mathbf{PWK}$|⁠. (shrink)

A very natural and philosophically important subclassical logic is FDE. This account of logical consequence can be seen as going beyond the standard two-valued account to a four-valued account. A natural question arises: What account of logical consequence arises from considering further combinations of such values? A partial answer was given by Priest in 2014; Shramko and Wansing had also given a partial result some years earlier, although in a different context. In this note we generalize Priest’s result to show (...) that even if one considers ordinal-many combinations of the previous values, for any ordinal, the resulting consequence relation remains FDE. (shrink)

Change of logic is typically taken as requiring that the meanings of the connectives change too. As a result, it has been argued that legitimate rivalry between logics is under threat. This is, in a nutshell, the meaning‐variance argument, traditionally attributed to Quine. In this paper, we present a semantic framework that allows us to resist the meaning‐variance claim for an important class of systems: classical logic, the logic of paradox and strong Kleene logic. The major feature of the semantics (...) is that the connectives have the same meanings in these systems, so that the meaning‐variance argument is straightforwardly blocked. We discuss the effects of this semantics for two uses of the argument of meaning variance, and also consider its impact on related issues. (shrink)

In this paper we devise non-distributive relatives of Exactly true logic by Pietz and Riveccio and its dual Non-falsity logic by Shramko, Zaitsev and Belikov. We consider two pre-orders which are algebraic counterparts of the ETL’s and NFL’s entailment relations on the de Morgan lattice 4. We generalise these pre-orders and determine which distributive properties that hold on 4 are not forced by either of the pre-orders. We then construct relatives of ETL and NFL but lack such distributive properties. For (...) these logics we also devise a truth table semantics which uses non-distributive lattice M3 as their lattice of truth values. We also provide analytic tableaux systems which work with sequents of the form \. We then prove correctness and completeness results for these proof systems and provide a neat generalisation for non-distributive ETL- and NFL-like logics built over a certain family of non-distributive modular lattices. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that the usual approach to modelling knowledge and belief with the necessity modality |$\Box $| does not produce intuitive outcomes in the framework of the Belnap–Dunn logic (⁠|$\textsf{BD}$|⁠, alias |$\textbf{FDE}$|—first-degree entailment). We then motivate and introduce a nonstandard modality |$\blacksquare $| that formalizes knowledge and belief in |$\textsf{BD}$| and use |$\blacksquare $| to define |$\bullet $| and |$\blacktriangledown $| that formalize the unknown truth and ignorance as not knowing whether, respectively. Moreover, we introduce another modality (...) |$\textbf{I}$| that stands for factive ignorance and show its connection with |$\blacksquare $|⁠. We equip these modalities with Kripke-frame-based semantics and construct a sound and complete analytic cut system for |$\textsf{BD}^{\blacksquare }$| and |$\textsf{BD}^{\textbf{I}}$|—the expansions of |$\textsf{BD}$| with |$\blacksquare $| and |$\textbf{I}$|⁠. In addition, we show that |$\Box $| as it is customarily defined in |$\textsf{BD}$| cannot define any of the introduced modalities, nor, conversely, neither |$\blacksquare $| nor |$\textbf{I}$| can define |$\Box $|⁠. We also demonstrate that |$\blacksquare $| and |$\textbf{I}$| are not interdefinable and establish the definability of several important classes of frames using |$\blacksquare $|⁠. (shrink)