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III.--Unreasonable action

Mind 2 (6):174-187 (1893)

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  1. Sidgwick on Pleasure.Robert Shaver - 2016 - Ethics 126 (4):901-928.
    Sidgwick holds that pleasures are feelings that appear desirable qua feeling. I defend this interpretation against other views sometimes attributed to Sidgwick—for example, the view that pleasures are feelings that are desired qua feeling, or that pleasures are feelings with a particular feel that can be specified independently of desire. I then defend Sidgwick’s view against recent objections. I conclude that his account of pleasure should be attractive to those looking for an account suitable for normative work.
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  • T. H. Green and Henry Sidgwick on free agency and the guise of the good. E. E. Sheng - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    The history of the thesis of the guise of the good between Kant and Anscombe is not well understood. This article examines a notable disagreement over the thesis during this period, between Green and Sidgwick. It shows that Green accepts versions of the thesis concerning action and desire in one sense of 'desire', and that Sidgwick rejects the thesis concerning both action and desire. It then considers why Green accepts the thesis, and assesses Sidgwick's criticism of Green. Despite the appearance (...)
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