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  1. Rawlsian Constructivism In Moral Theory.David O. Brink - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):71-90.
    Since his article, ‘Outline for a Decision Procedure in Ethics,’ John Rawls has advocated a coherentist moral epistemology according to which moral and political theories are justified on the basis of their coherence with our other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral. A moral theory which is maximally coherent with our other beliefs is in a state which Rawls calls ‘reflective equilibrium’. In A Theory of Justice Rawls advanced two principles of justice and claimed that they are in reflective equilibrium. He (...)
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  • Wollheim's paradox: Comment.Brian Barry - 1973 - Political Theory 1 (3):317-322.
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  • The evolution of philosophy of education within educational studies.J. R. Muir - 1996 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 28 (2):1-26.
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  • In what sense must political philosophy be political?David Miller - 2016 - Social Philosophy and Policy 33 (1-2):155-174.
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  • My Role and its Duties.Martin Hollis - 1974 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 8:180-199.
    Recipes for the Good Society used to run, in caricature, something like this: 1. Take about 2000 hoM, sap. , analyse each into essence and accidents and discard the accidents. 2. Place essences in a large casserole, add socialising syrup and stew until conflict disappears. 3. Serve with a pinch of salt.
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  • Rawls’ methodological blueprint.Jonathan Floyd - 2017 - European Journal of Political Theory 16 (3):367-381.
    Rawls’ primary legacy is not that he standardised a particular view of justice, but rather that he standardised a particular method of arguing about it: justification via reflective equilibrium. Yet this method, despite such standardisation, is often misunderstood in at least four ways. First, we miss its continuity across his various works. Second, we miss the way in which it unifies other justificatory ideas, such as the ‘original position’ and an ‘overlapping consensus’. Third, we miss its fundamentally empirical character, given (...)
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