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  1. Promising Across Lives to Save Non-Existent Beings: Identity, Rebirth, and the Bodhisattva's Vow.Stephen E. Harris - 2018 - Philosophy East and West 68 (2):386-407.
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  • The Buddhist Refusal of Theism.Matthew T. Kapstein - 2005 - Diogenes 52 (1):61-65.
    Early Buddhism was not interested in questions about existence and the nature of God, considering these unimportant in relation to the question of the release from earthly suffering which is at the heart of Buddhist soteriology. Later Buddhist thought considered theism incompatible with Buddhist doctrine, but at the same time Buddhism developed a dimension of devotion that resembled theistic faith. Conscious of their different religious heritage, Buddhist thinkers in more recent times have nevertheless embraced dialogue with monotheistic religions, emphasizing their (...)
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  • (1 other version)Experiential Unity without a Self: The Case of Synchronic Synthesis.Monima Chadha & Shaun Nichols - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):631-647.
    The manifest fact of experiential unity—namely, that a single experience often seems to be composed of multiple features and multiple objects—was lodged as a key objection to the Buddhist no-self view by Nyāya philosophers in the classical Indian tradition. We revisit the Nyāya-Buddhist debate on this issue. The early Nyāya experiential unity arguments depend on diachronic unification of experiences in memory, but later Nyāya philosophers explicitly widened the scope to incorporate new unity arguments that invoke synchronic unification in experiences. We (...)
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  • Buddhist idealism and the problem of other minds.Roy W. Perrett - 2017 - Asian Philosophy 27 (1):59-68.
    This essay is concerned with Indian Yogācāra philosophers’ treatment of the problem of other minds in the face of a threatened collapse into solipsism suggested by Vasubandhu’s epistemological argument for idealism. I discuss the attempts of Dharmakīrti and Ratnakīrti to address this issue, concluding that Dharmakīrti is best seen as addressing the epistemological problem of other minds and Ratnakīrti as addressing the conceptual problem of other minds.
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  • Studies in dhāraṇī literature I: Revisiting the meaning of the term dhāraṇī. [REVIEW]Ronald M. Davidson - 2009 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 37 (2):97-147.
    The Mahāyāna Buddhist term dhāraṇī has been understood to be problematic since the mid-nineteenth century, when it was often translated as “magical phrase” or “magical formula” and was considered to be emblematic of tantric Buddhism. The situation improved in contributions by Bernhard, Lamotte and Braarvig, and the latter two suggested the translation be “memory,” but this remained difficult in many environments. This paper argues that dhāraṇī is a function term denoting “codes/coding,” so that the category dhāraṇī is polysemic and context-sensitive. (...)
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  • The Marvel of Consciousness: Existence and Manifestation in Jñānaśrīmitra’s Sākārasiddhiśāstra.Davey K. Tomlinson - 2022 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 50 (1):163-199.
    This paper considers Jñānaśrīmitra’s defense of manifestation as the criterion of ultimate existence. In the first section, "Asatkhyāti and Adhyavasāya: making sense of manifestation as the criterion of the real", I show the way that, in response to Ratnākaraśānti’s Nirākāravāda, Jñānaśrīmitra argues for a sharp distinction between manifestation and determination in an effort to establish that the manifestation of something unreal is incoherent. The unreal, he thinks, is only ever determined; it is never manifest to consciousness, properly speaking. In the (...)
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  • (1 other version)Experiential Unity without a Self: The Case of Synchronic Synthesis.Shaun Nichols & Monima Chadha - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):631-647.
    ABSTRACT The manifest fact of experiential unity—namely, that a single experience often seems to be composed of multiple features and multiple objects—was lodged as a key objection to the Buddhist no-self view by Nyāya philosophers in the classical Indian tradition. We revisit the Nyāya-Buddhist debate on this issue. The early Nyāya experiential unity arguments depend on diachronic unification of experiences in memory, but later Nyāya philosophers explicitly widened the scope to incorporate new unity arguments that invoke synchronic unification in experiences. (...)
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  • Śubhagupta on the Cognitive Process.Margherita Serena Saccone - 2014 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 42 (2-3):377-399.
    In his *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā (BASK), “Verses on the Establishment of the External Object”—extant only in Tibetan translation—Śubhagupta (720–780 CE), a philosopher connected with the logical-epistemological school of Buddhism, argues the reality of external objects of cognitions. In this article, I shall provide an account of Śubhagupta's theory of the cognitive process, as expressed in BASK 35–44, particularly in light of his view that the images (ākāra) of those objects do not appear in cognition. BASK is part of an internal Buddhist debate (...)
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  • On the Distinction Between Epistemic and Metaphysical Buddhist Idealisms: A Śaiva Perspective. [REVIEW]Isabelle Ratié - 2014 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 42 (2-3):353-375.
    Modern scholarship has often wondered whether Indian Buddhist idealism is primarily epistemic or metaphysical: does this idealism amount to a kind of transcendental scepticism according to which we cannot decide whether objects exist or not outside of consciousness because we can have no epistemic access whatsoever to these objects? Or is it rather ontologically committed, i.e., does it consist in denying the very existence of the external world? One could deem the question anachronistic and suspect that with such an inquiry (...)
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  • Three Senses of Atomic Accumulation—An Interpretation of Vasubandhu’s Viṃśikā Stanzas 12–13 in Light of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and Dharmapāla’s Dasheng Guangbailun Shilun. [REVIEW]Ching Keng - 2019 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 47 (3):565-601.
    Vasubandhu’s Twenty Stanzas (Viṃśikā) is among the most influential anti-Realist philosophical treatises in the history of Indian Buddhism. In particular, his refutation of the theories about the accumulation of atoms (paramāṇu) in stanza 12 if often regarded as compelling or even conclusive. But if this is the case, then the transition from stanza 12 to 13 would seem very odd, because in stanza 13 Vasubandhu bothers himself with yet another version of atomic accumulation. In this paper, I give an interpretation (...)
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  • Reconstructing memories, deconstructing the self.Monima Chadha - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (1):121-138.
    The paper evaluates a well‐known argument for a self from episodic memories—that remembering that I did something or thought something involves experiencing the identity of my present self with the past doer or thinker. Shaun Nichols argues that although it phenomenologically appears to be the case that we are identical with the past self, no metaphysical conclusion can be drawn from the phenomenology. I draw on literature from contemporary psychology and Buddhist resources to arrive at a more radical conclusion: that (...)
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  • No-Self and the Phenomenology of Ownership.Monima Chadha - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):14-27.
    The Abhidharma Buddhist revisionary metaphysics aims to provide an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world that lacks a self. The first part of the paper claims that the Abhidharma ‘no-self’ view can be plausibly interpreted as a no-ownership view, according to which there is no locus or subject of experience and thus no owner of mental or bodily awarenesses. On this interpretation of the no-self view, the Abhidharma Buddhist metaphysicians are committed to denying the ownership of experiences, and (...)
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  • In Defense of His Guru: Dratsepa’s Rebuttal to the Challenges Articulated by the Proponents of the Other-Emptiness Doctrine. [REVIEW]Tsering Wangchuk - 2011 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (2):147-165.
    The buddha-nature literature has a significant place within the Indian Mahāyāna tradition and Tibetan Buddhism. While it is usually included in the so-called Last Wheel of the Buddha’s teachings, many Tibetan thinkers began to cast doubts about the textual significance of buddha-nature discourse in fourteenth-century Tibet. In this article, I will examine one particular case where there is apparent tension between multiple Tibetan masters over the importance of buddha-nature teachings. This paper primarily analyzes Dratsepa’s commentary to the Ornament (mdzes rgyan) (...)
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  • Imagine Being a Preta: Early Indian Yogācāra Approaches to Intersubjectivity.Roy Tzohar - 2017 - Sophia 56 (2):337-354.
    The paper deals with the early Yogācāra strategies for explaining intersubjective agreement under a ‘mere representations’ view. Examining Vasubandhu, Asaṅga, and Sthiramati’s use of the example of intersubjective agreement among the hungry ghosts, it is demonstrated that in contrast to the way in which it was often interpreted by contemporary scholars, this example in fact served these Yogācāra thinkers to perform an ironic inversion of the realist premise—showing that intersubjective agreement not only does not require the existence of mind-independent objects (...)
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  • Eliminating Selves and Persons.Monima Chadha - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (3):273-294.
    The Buddhist no-self and no-person revisionary metaphysics aims to produce a better structure that is motivated by the normative goal of eliminating, or at least reducing, suffering. The revised structure, in turn, entails a major reconsideration of our ordinary everyday person-related concerns and practices and interpersonal attitudes, such as moral responsibility, praise and blame, compensation, and social treatment. This essay explores the extent to which we must alter and perhaps discard some of our practical commitments in light of the Buddhist (...)
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  • Revisiting Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī.Ramesh K. Sharma - 2018 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 46 (1):113-151.
    In this paper, I attempt a further elucidation and defense of some of the things I said in my article “Critical Reflections on Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī” and a response to Professor Claus Oetke’s criticisms :371–394, 2012) of “a number of views which have been propagated” by me in my article. Although some additional issues have been raised, broadly, the themes addressed here are the same three as were the object of my investigation in that paper: namely, Nāgārjuna’s emptiness doctrine; his denial (...)
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  • Mental Freedom and Freedom of the Loving Heart: Free Will and Buddhist Meditation.Karin L. Meyers - 2020 - Zygon 55 (2):519-539.
    In Buddhism, Meditation and Free Will: A Theory of Mental Freedom , Rick Repetti explains how the dynamics of Buddhist meditation can result in a kind of metacognition and metavolitional control that exceeds what is required for free will and defeats the most powerful forms of free will skepticism. This article argues that although the Buddhist path requires and enhances the kind of mental and volitional control Repetti describes, the central dynamic of the path and meditation is better understood as (...)
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  • Intrauterine Dependent Origination: A Translation of the Indakasutta and its Commentaries.Giuliano Giustarini - 2021 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 49 (5):895-912.
    The Indakasutta, its commentary, and sub-commentary describe and discuss the phases of intrauterine development. By adopting a terminology remarkably comparable to that of other Buddhist and non-Buddhist texts, they illustrate fundamental Buddhist teachings like the non-self view and the dependent arising. I here offer a translation of these three texts, preceded by an introductory outline of their contents.
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  • The Dzokchen Apology: On the Limits of Logic, Language, & Epistemology in Early Great Perfection.Dominic Di Zinno Sur - 2021 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 50 (1):1-46.
    This article examines the translator, Rongzom’s, scholastic philosophical defense of early Dzokchen or “Great Perfection.” As our earliest instance of religious apologia in Tibet, this examination contributes to a growing body of knowledge about the Tibetan assimilation of post-tenth century of Vajrayāna Buddhism and the indigenous response to the forces of cultural transformation shaping the late eleventh/early twelfth century Tibet. Traditional authorities and academics have identified Dzokchen as a Tibetan tradition of Buddhism that drew intense criticism at the time from (...)
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