Supererogation can be distinguished from altruism, in that the former is located in the category of duty but exceeds the strict requirements of duty, whereas altruism belongs to a different moral category from duty. It follows that doctors do not act altruistically in their professional roles. Individual doctors may sometimes show supererogation, but supererogation is not a necessary feature of the medical profession. The aim of medicine is to act in the best interests of patients. This aim involves neither supererogation (...) nor even the moral quality of beneficence. It is simply a job description. Morality enters medicine through the quality of the individual doctor's work, not by the definition of that work. (shrink)

Members of the legal, medical and accounting professions are guided in their professional behavior by their respective codes of ethics. These codes of ethics are not static. They are ever evolving, responding to forces that are exogenous and endogenous to the professions. Specifically, changes in the ethical codes are often due to economic and social events, governmental influence, and growth and change within the professions. This paper presents an historical analysis of the major events leading to changes in the legal, (...) medical and accounting codes of ethics. (shrink)

The recent essay by Schuklenk and Smalling opposing respect for physicians’ conscientious objections to providing patients with medical services that are legally permitted in liberal democracies is based on several erroneous assumptions. Acting in this manner would have serious harmful effects on the ethos of medicine and of bioethics. A much more nuanced and balanced position is critical in order to respect physicians’ conscience with minimal damage to patients’ rights.

Supererogatory acts are considered by some to be part of medicine, whereas others accept supererogation to be a gratuitous virtue, to be extolled when present, but not to be demanded. The present paper sides with those contending that medicine is duty-bound to benefit patients and that supererogation/altruism must per definition remain outside and beyond any role-description of the profession. Medical ethics should be bound by rational ethics and steer away from separatist views which grant exclusive privileges but also create excessive (...) demands, way beyond what physicians perform or are willing and able to offer. (shrink)

In the light of increasing public mistrust, there is an urgent need to clarify the moral status of the medical profession and of the relationship of the clinician to his/her patients. In addressing this question, I first establish the coherence, within moral philosophy generally, of the concept of supererogation . I adopt the notion of an act of “unqualified” supererogation as one that is non-derivatively good, praiseworthy, and freely undertaken for others' benefit at the risk of some cost to the (...) agent. I then argue that committing oneself to the profession of clinical medicine is an act of this kind. This is the case, not because the aim of medicine is to help patients, but because of the open ended commitment of time and the vulnerability to the consequences of failure that the clinician must accept. (shrink)