Assisted migration, an ecosystem engineering technology, is receiving increasing attention and significant support as a means to save biodiversity in a changing climate. Few substantive, or not obviously deficient, reasons have been offered for why pursuing this conservation goal via these means might be good. Some proponents of AM, including those who identify themselves as “pragmatists,” even suggest there is little need for such argument. We survey the principal reasons offered for AM, as well as reasons offered for not offering (...) reasons. As exemplified by the case for translocating whitebark pine, which may at first seem especially strong, we note the incongruence of framing the goal of AM in terms of “saving biodiversity,” neglect of some crucial moral questions, marginalization of normative and scientific context when AM is cast as the lesser of two evils in a “crisis,” doubtful validity and, in any case, marginal importance of arguments that AM projects ought to be undertaken, inconsistent use of scientific facts, and omission of science that counters sanguine assessments. All told—even in cases such as whitebark pine for which AM may seem most defensible—there is little reason to think that AM projects are good as means to “save biodiversity,” or good as means to other goals that have accreted into arguments for these projects. (shrink)

Conservation biologists recognize a duty to maintain as much value as possible in ecosystems that are threatened by recent anthropogenic impacts. Until recently the paradigm of contemporary conservation seemed relatively straightforward: the best way to maintain the value of species and ecosystems at a given location was to maintain—or shepherd the system back towards—historical conditions. Among the most difficult theoretical tasks was the determination of “baseline” historical conditions (or trajectories) to return to, recognizing the dynamism of ecosystems over time. However, (...) the rate, scale, and magnitude of contemporary climate change, species introductions, and land-use change make it increasingly impractical to return locations to any kind of historical state. This forces a paradigm shift which is both ongoing and difficult, and necessitates a rigorous evaluation of the scientific and ethical foundations of modern conservation along with a careful reexamination of terminology. Here, I discuss the moral relevance and waning utility of the geographically-based and dichotomous understanding of “native” (or “in situ”) which is an important component of conservation ethics and practice. I then propose a new understanding of nativeness in which a species is native—not to a geographic location—but to a quantifiable set of biotic, climatic, geologic, and topographic conditions (i.e. its niche) that can then map to geographic space. Following this, I demonstrate the unique utility of this concept, which I will refer to as “econativeness,” in thinking through conservation problems—range expansions, range contractions, species introductions, and assisted migration—where the classical understanding of nativeness has become increasingly inadequate for assessing the moral value of species. (shrink)