Most psychological and philosophical theories assume that we know what we feel. This general view is often accompanied by a range of more specific claims, such as the idea that we experience one emotion at a time, and that it is possible to distinguish between emotions based on their cognition, judgment, behaviour, or physiology. One common approach is to discriminate emotions based on their motivations or ultimate goals. Some argue that empathic distress, for instance, has the potential to motivate empathic (...) concerns; personal distress, on the other hand, is self-oriented and motivates egoistic concerns. In this paper, I argue against this and similarly teleological views of emotions and affect. Through a close study of the emotional breakdown of an American drone operator, I make the case that understanding our emotions entails much more ambiguity than dominant theories assume. In our emotional lives, disorientation and confusion are often the norm. (shrink)

This paper argues for an explanation of self-hatred where quintessential cases of self-hatred are caused by shame. Self-hatred (hatred directed at oneself) is distinguished from other-hatred (hatred directed at others). While the latter has enjoyed much attention, the former has enjoyed little. Self-hatred, however, is interestingly different from its other-focused cousin in that other-hatred presupposes a sense of positive self-worth while self-hatred does not. In explaining self-hatred, I first contend that the formal object of hatred is best understood as incorrigibility, (...) then I show that self-hatred involves identifying oneself with a negative trait, causing a self-evaluation of incorrigibility. This kind of identification calls for explanation. To this end, I argue that existential shame not only leads one to internalize a globalizing negative evaluation but also leads one to identify themselves with the negative trait at the heart of the self-evaluation of incorrigibility. These facets of existential shame, then, explain some quintessential cases of self-hatred. (shrink)

Un parallèle est fréquemment établi entre le blâme de soi et le blâme d'autrui. Cet article cherche à montrer que celui-ci est infondé et que le blâme de soi et le blâme d’autrui ne sont que superficiellement analogues. Pour ce faire, nous montrerons qu’aucun des rapprochements défendus dans la littérature contemporaine n’est concluant. Nous commencerons par distinguer la phénoménologie du blâme de soi de celle du blâme d’autrui. Dans un second temps, nous distinguerons la fonction du blâme de soi de (...) celle du blâme d’autrui. Finalement, nous montrerons que le blâme de soi est moralement acceptable dans des cas où le blâme d’autrui est interdit. À travers cette discussion, nous espérons montrer que le blâme de soi est une attitude fondamentalement différente du blâme d’autrui et qu’il mérite notre attention en tant que phénomène distinct. A parallel is often drawn between self-blame and interpersonal blame. This article seeks to show that this parallel is unfounded and that self-blame and interpersonal blame are only superficially analogous. To this end, we will show that none of the comparisons defended in contemporary literature is conclusive. We will begin by distinguishing the phenomenology of self-blame from that of interpersonal blame. Second, we will distinguish the function of self-blame from that of interpersonal blame. Finally, we will show that self-blame is morally permissible in cases where interpersonal blame is prohibited. With this discussion, we hope to show that self-blame is a fundamentally different attitude from interpersonal blame and that it deserves our attention as a distinct phenomenon. (shrink)

For many, anger has been seen as irrationality, even as illness. But it seems that anger-related disorder and its culture-relatedness have not receive much attention in psychiatry. Like backward-looking ressentiment, hwabyeong 火病can be literally translated into anger disorder. In this paper, I examine the notion of anger and culture with the help of considering the case of hwabyeong as a Korean culture-bound syndrome (hereafter, CBS). Drawing on historical changes in the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) and cases (...) of hwabyeong as CBS, I will argue that the social and cultural aspects of mental disorder are indispensable parts. Additionally, it will be suggested that the rigid distinction between CBS and mental disorders is questionable. First, I begin by examining Jarome Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis and Ian Hacking’s social constructionism on mental disorder. Next, given that the illness is common among poor old women who suffered from patriarchal social structures, I question whether hwabyeong is really a culturally specific illness. Moreover, hwabyeong cannot be properly understood without considering unequal power relations and extremely limited ranges of one's agency. Thus, calling it culture- bound may be due to WEIRD-ish (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic), culturally stereotypical prejudice as well as misogynic thinking concerning hwabyeong. In present times, it's worth noting that, despite common biases, hwabyeong or han (恨) is no longer solely a Korean phenomenon, thanks to recent societal advancements. In conclusion, I show that curing hwabyeong or anger management is not just medical but sociopolitical matters. (shrink)