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Plato on "Phantasia"

Allan Silverman

Classical Antiquity 10 (1):123-147 (1991)

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Two Kinds of Belief in Plato.Gösta Grönroos - 2013 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (1):1-19.details In thesophist (263e10–264b4), Plato distinguishes between two kinds of belief. On the one hand, there is a kind of belief that occurs “according to thinking” (κατὰ διάνοιαν), being “the completion of thinking” (διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις). This kind is called ‘doxa.’ On the other hand, there is another kind of belief that occurs “through sense perception” (δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως). This kind is called ‘phantasia,’ perhaps best rendered as “appearing.”1 The purpose of this paper is to uncover the distinction between these two different kinds (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Plato and Peirce on Likeness and Semblance.Han-Liang Chang - 2012 - Biosemiotics 5 (3):301-312.details In his well-known essay, ‘What Is a Sign?’ (CP 2.281, 285) Peirce uses ‘likeness’ and ‘resemblance’ interchangeably in his definition of icon. The synonymity of the two words has rarely, if ever, been questioned. Curiously, a locus classicus of the pair, at least in F. M. Cornford’s English translation, can be found in a late dialogue of Plato, namely, the Sophist. In this dialogue on the myth and truth of the sophists’ profession, the mysterious ‘stranger’, who is most likely Socrates’ (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
“A Notion of the True System of the World”: Berkeley and his Use of Plato in Siris.Peter D. Larsen - 2022 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 104 (3):539-565.details This paper considers Berkeley’s use of Plato in Siris. Berkeley’s engagement with ancient thinkers in Siris has been a source of puzzlement for many readers. In this paper I focus on Siris § 266. In particular, I consider why Berkeley says of the Platonists that they “distinguished the primary qualities in bodies from the secondary” and why, given his own well-known misgivings about the distinction, he characterizes this as part of a “notion of the true system of the world.” I (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Appearance, Perception, and Non-Rational Belief: Republic 602c-603a.Damien Storey - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 47:81-118.details In book 10 of the Republic we find a new argument for the division of the soul. The argument’s structure is similar to the arguments in book 4 but, unlike those arguments, it centres on a purely cognitive conflict: believing and disbelieving the same thing, at the same time. The argument presents two interpretive difficulties. First, it assumes that a conflict between a belief and an appearance—e.g. disbelieving that a stick partially immersed in water is, as it appears, bent—entails a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Images dans le texte : l'eikonologia platonicienne.Elsa Grasso - 2013 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 4 (4):525-541.details Download Export citation Bookmark
The Duality of phantasia in Plotinus: Two Faculties, or Two Representations?Eleni Perdikouri - 2016 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 19 (1):212-234.details This paper argues that the duality of phantasia consists not in its being divided between two faculties, but in its being the meeting point of two representations. First it is argued that Plotinus’ theory, according to which the representation is a judgement, rests on his reading of Theaetetus 184c–187a and its criticism in De Anima III, 2–3. Second, it is argued that the ‘image’ in which the Plotinian representation consists follows the perceptual judgement instead of preceding it. Third, it is (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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