In this article, I discuss Robert Kilwardby’s theory of judgement and consider its implications for his view of truth and falsity. I start by considering Kilwardby’s claim that truth and falsity are primarily found in composite thought, i.e. judgement. I then examine his distinction between two different kinds of being, namely real and conceptual, arguing that different kinds of true judgement, according to Kilwardby, have different kinds of existential import, either real or merely conceptual. Since Kilwardby develops his position by (...) commenting on Aristotle’s logical treatises, an important aim of the article is that of showing how he addresses exegetical issues in those sources and offers solutions that go beyond Aristotle’s alleged intentions. The focus of the paper is on negative judgement because that is where Kilwardby diverges from Aristotle most conspicuously. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss Robert Kilwardby’s theory of judgement and consider its implications for his view of truth and falsity. I start by considering Kilwardby’s claim that truth and falsity are primarily found in composite thought, i.e. judgement. I then examine his distinction between two different kinds of being, namely real and conceptual, arguing that different kinds of true judgement, according to Kilwardby, have different kinds of existential import, either real or merely conceptual. Since Kilwardby develops his position by (...) commenting on Aristotle’s logical treatises, an important aim of the article is that of showing how he addresses exegetical issues in those sources and offers solutions that go beyond Aristotle’s alleged intentions. The focus of the paper is on negative judgement because that is where Kilwardby diverges from Aristotle most conspicuously. (shrink)