Organizations in changing environments need to become flexible, responsive and participative. We develop an understanding of governance in these organizations by drawing analogies between organization theory and theories of non-linear dynamics. We identify freedom and creativity as driving principles in 'chaotic' participative organizations, and explore the ethics of their exercise within organizational communities of practice, communities of discernment and communities of commitment.

The aim of this work is to present aggregation methods of hierarchically organized systems allowing one to replace the initial micro-system by a macro-system described by a few global variables. We also study the relations between the fast micro-dynamics and the slow macro-dynamics which can produce global properties. Emergence corresponds to a bottom-up coupling that is the result effected by a micro-level at a macro-level. As an example, we present prey-predator models with different time scales in an heterogeneous environment. A (...) fast time scale is associated to the migration process on spatial patches and a slow time scale is associated to growth and interactions between the populations. Preys must go on spatial patches where resources are located and where predators can attack them. The efficiency of the predators to catch preys is patch dependent. Perturbation methods allow us to aggregate the initial system of differential equations for the patch sub-populations into a macro-system of two differential equations governing the total population densities. We study the case of density independent and density dependent migrations. In the latter case, we show that different functional responses can emerge in the macro prey-predator model as a result of the coupling between the slow and fast systems. (shrink)

Cognitive modules are internal mental structures. Some theorists and empirical researchers hypothesize that the human mind is either partially or massively comprised of structures that are modular in nature. Modules are also invoked to explain cognitive capacities associated with the performance of specific functional tasks. Jerry Fodor (1983) considered that modules are useful only for explaining relatively low-level systems (input systems). These are the systems involved in capacities like perception and language. For Fodor, the central (high-level) systems of mind — (...) those involved in capacities like judgment (the “fixation of belief” in Fodor’s jargon), planning (practical reasoning), decision-making, and so forth — are not explainable in terms of modular mechanisms. However, some other philosophers as well as proponents and practitioners of evolutionary psychology consider that it is sensible — and even necessary — to invoke modules for explaining these systems, too. Indeed, the debate over modularity is mainly a debate over the modularity of central systems (high-level cognitive capacities). Admittedly, it is also possible to raise doubts about the modularity of peripheral systems (Prinz, 2006), but this kind of skepticism is not widespread in the literature. In contrast, both the empirical and the theoretical (a priori) cases in favor of central modularity are usually contested on multiple fronts and in tough terms. The case for the modularity of central systems is the core of the case for the massive modularity of mind hypothesis (viz. the hypothesis that consists in asserting that both the peripheral and the central systems of human mind are largely composed of modules). Granted, the massive modularity of mind hypothesis is an empirical statement and, as such, its truth should be ultimately decided in an empirical way, not a priori (Sperber, 1994, 2001). Nonetheless, much of the debate over massive modularity has taken place on theoretical grounds. This is due to an alleged underdetermination of the hypotheses regarding the modularity of central systems by data. In such conditions, the remaining open option has been to advance theoretical considerations in favor of the plausibility — and not directly in favor of the empirical truth or truthlikeness — of the massive modularity of mind generally, and of the modularity of some central systems in particular. These theoretical considerations are mostly based on an adaptationist view of evolution cum a classical computationalist approach to mind. They include arguments about the nature and evolution of hierarchically ordered complex systems (the evolvability of complexity argument), a presumption of optimality expressed in the apparent design of phenotypic traits shaped by natural selection (the task-specificity argument) and dismissing nonmodular mental architectures as computationally intractable (the tractability argument). Is the massive modularity of mind hypothesis a cogent view about the ontological nature of human mind or is it, rather, an effective/ineffective adaptationist discovery heuristic for generating predictively successful hypothesis about both heretofore unknown psychological traits and unknown properties of already identified psychological traits? Considering the inadequacies of the case in favor of massive modularity as an ontological hypothesis, I suggest approaching and valuing massive modularity as an adaptationist discovery heuristic. (shrink)

Spoken language consists of a linear sequence of units, from which the existence of particular underlying hierarchical processing mechanisms is inferred. Uddén et al. use graph theory to provide a framework for describing the possible structural relationships that may underlie a linear output sequence. Being more explicit in defining different structures can help identifying and testing for such structures in AGL experiments, as well as help showing how behavioral and neuroimaging data reveals signatures of hierarchical processing in humans.

“No one can serve two masters.” This Bible quotation highlights an irreducible contradiction, which echoes numerous organizational settings. This article considers the under-explored ethical implications of paradoxical injunctions created by such a contradiction at the managerial level. Contradictory organizational constraints turn into paradoxant systems , where the organization structurally settles paradoxical injunctions which challenge managerial ethics in practice. We then ask what managerial responsibility means in such contexts and find that managers have then to reshape their practice as a situated (...) construction through constant mediation between different “masters” and bricolage (i.e., tinkering with concepts). An ethnographic case study of an anti-money laundering service in an investment bank illuminates this phenomenon from a practice perspective. The possibility to enact an actual ethical practice within the contradictory organization relies on a new role of the manager. This implies drawing on an approach of responsible management as an enactment of ethics in practice which is situated within the framework of a new conception of both the organization, as a structurally “paradoxant system,” and the manager as a mediator in charge of enacting coherence. (shrink)

Despite remarkable empirical and methodological advances, our theoretical understanding of the evolutionary processes that made us human remains fragmented and contentious. Here, we make the radical proposition that the cultural communities within which Homo emerged may be understood as a novel exotic form of organism. The argument begins from a deep congruence between robust features of Pan community life cycles and protocell models of the origins of life. We argue that if a cultural tradition, meeting certain requirements, arises in the (...) context of such a “social protocell,” the outcome will be an evolutionary transition in individuality whereby traditions and hominins coalesce into a macroscopic bio-socio-technical system, with an organismal organization that is culturally inherited through irreversible fission events on the community level. We refer to the resulting hypothetical evolutionary individual as a “sociont.” The social protocell provides a preadapted source of alignment of fitness interests that addresses a number of open questions about the origins of shared adaptive cultural organization, and the derived genetic adaptations that support them. Also, social cooperation between hominins is no longer in exclusive focus since cooperation among traditions becomes salient in this model. This provides novel avenues for explanation. We go on to hypothesize that the fate of the hominin in such a setting would be mutualistic coadaptation into a part-whole relation with the sociont, and we propose that the unusual suite of derived features in Homo is consistent with this hypothesis. (shrink)

Functional localization has historically been one of the primary goals of neuroscience. There is still debate, however, about whether it is possible, and if so what kind of theories succeed at localization. I argue for a contextualist approach to localization. Most theorists assume that widespread contextual variability in function is fundamentally incompatible with functional decomposition in the brain, because contextualist accounts will fail to be generalizable and projectable. I argue that this assumption is misplaced. A properly articulated contextualism can ground (...) successful theories of localization even without positing completely generalizable accounts. Via a case study from perceptual neuroscience, I suggest that there is strong evidence for contextual variation in the function of perceptual brain areas. I then outline a version of contextualism that is empirically adequate with respect to this data, and claim that it can still distinguish brain areas from each other according to their functional properties. Finally, I claim that the view does not fail the norms for good theory in the way that anticontextualists suppose. It is true that, on a contextualist view, we will not have theories that are completely generalizable and predictive. We can, however, have successful partial generalizations that structure ongoing investigation and lead to novel functional insight, and this success is sufficient to ground the project of functional localization. (shrink)

A scientific explanatory project, part-whole explanation, and a kind of science, part-whole science are premised on identifying, investigating, and using parts and wholes. In the biological sciences, mechanistic, structuralist, and historical explanations are part-whole explanations. Each expresses different norms, explananda, and aims. Each is associated with a distinct partitioning frame for abstracting kinds of parts. These three explanatory projects can be complemented in order to provide an integrative vision of the whole system, as is shown for a detailed case study: (...) the tetrapod limb. My diagnosis of part-whole explanation in the biological sciences as well as in other domains exploring evolved, complex, and integrated systems (e.g., psychology and cognitive science) cross-cuts standard philosophical categories of explanation: causal explanation and explanation as unification. Part-whole explanation is itself one essential aspect of part-whole science. (shrink)

The emergence of transaction cost economics in the early 1970s with Oliver Williamson's successful reconciliation of the so-called neoclassical approach with Herbert Simon's organizational theory can be considered an important part of the first cognitive turn in economics. The development of TCE until the late 1980s was particularly marked by treating the firm as an avoider of negative frictions, i.e., of transaction costs. However, since the 1990s TCE has been enriched by various approaches stressing the role of the firm in (...) creating positive value, e.g., the literature on modularity. Hence, a second cognitive turn has taken place: the firm is no longer only seen as an avoider of negative costs but also as a creator of positive knowledge. (shrink)

Müller's target article aims to summarize approaches to the question of how language elements (phonemes, morphemes, etc.) and rules are laid down in the brain. However, it suffers from being too vague about basic assumptions and empirical predictions of neurobiological models, and the empirical evidence available to test the models is not appropriately evaluated. (1) In a neuroscientific model of language, different cortical localizations of words can only be based on biological principles. These need to be made explicit. (2) Evidence (...) for and against word class differences could be evaluated more rigorously. (3) All (and only) humans are able to learn languages with complex syntactic structures; it is, therefore, not appropriate to deny innateness and universality of syntactic principles. The real question appears to be the following: Which neurobiological principles are the linguistic principles based on? (shrink)

The synthetic position adopted by Müller is weakened by a large number of overinterpretations and misrepresentations, together with a caricatured view of innateness and modularity.

A lengthy debate in the philosophy of the cognitive sciences has turned on whether the phenomenon known as ‘systematicity’ of language and thought shows that connectionist explanatory aspirations are misguided. We investigate the issue of just which phenomenon ‘systematicity’ is supposed to be. The much-rehearsed examples always suggest that being systematic has something to do with ways in which some parts of expressions in natural languages (and, more conjecturally, some parts of thoughts) can be substituted for others without altering well-formedness. (...) We show that under one construal this yields a grossly weak claim that is not just compatible with a narrow version of associationist psychology but essentially coincides with a formalization of its descriptive power. Under another construal we get a claim (apparently unintended) that requires natural languages to fall within the context-free class, a claim that most linguists regard as too strong. Looking more closely at this proposed reconstruction of systematicity leads us to endorse, with further illustrations, the suggestion of Johnson (2004) that systematicity as a matter of substitutability of co-categorial constituents for one another does not appearto hold of natural languages at all. The appeal of the ill-delineated notion of systematicity may lie in the fact that within certain subclasses of lexical items mutual intersubstitutability does seem to hold, and theexplanation for that lies in a limitation on human memory: we simply cannot learn separate privileges of syntactic distribution for all of the huge number of words and phrases that we know. (shrink)

How neuropsychology is necessary but insufficient for understanding spirituality is explored. Multileveled spiritual requisites are systematically examined in terms of their neuropsychological constituents and limitations. The central “problem of integrity” is articulated via the “modularity” of our neuropsychology, and evidence is presented for disunities of self and consciousness. It is argued that the integrity of self or spirit is a contingent achievement rather than a necessary given. Integrating possibilities include belief, emotion, and relationships. Understanding integrity, and the transformations of self-surrender (...) and sacrifice, may require explicitly stepping beyond neuropsychology and including the self in a larger system. (shrink)

A short review of complexity research from the perspective of history and philosophy of biology is presented. Complexity and its emergence has scientific and metaphysical meanings. From its beginning, biology was a science of complex systems, but with the advent of electronic computing and the possibility of simulating mathematical models of complicated systems, new intuitions of complexity emerged, together with attempts to devise quantitative measures of complexity. But can we quantify the complex?

This paper examines the dispute between Burge and McDowell over methodology in the philosophy of perception. Burge (2005, 2011) has argued that the disjunctivism posited by naive perceptual realists is incompatible with the results of current perceptual science, while McDowell (2010, 2013) defends his disjunctivism by claiming an autonomous field of enquiry for perceptual epistemology, one that does not employ the classificatory schemes of the science. Here it is argued that the crucial point at issue in the dispute is Burge’s (...) acceptance, and McDowell’s rejection, of the ‘Cartesian idealization’ of mind as a self-contained system. Burge’s case against disjunctivism rests on the assumption of a clearly demarcated boundary between mind and world, a picture of the mind that McDowell’s philosophy reacts against. This boundary is required for scientific, causal explanations of perceptual processing because it is a simplifying assumption that helps present scientists with a clearly demarcated object of investigation. Concurring with McDowell, I conclude that philosophers need not carve up their objects of investigation in the same way. (shrink)

The consensus among cultural evolutionists seems to be that human cultural evolution is cumulative, which is commonly understood in the specific sense that cultural traits, especially technological traits, increase in complexity over generations. Here we argue that there is insufficient credible evidence in favor of or against this technological complexity thesis. For one thing, the few datasets that are available hardly constitute a representative sample. For another, they substantiate very specific, and usually different versions of the complexity thesis or, even (...) worse, do not point to complexity increases. We highlight the problems our findings raise for current work in cultural-evolutionary theory, and present various suggestions for future research. (shrink)

Donald T. Campbell argued that the organization of university departments shaped the boundaries among specialties. This article extends his argument in two ways. First, specialties are also shaped by other institutions, such as sponsors and learned societies. Second, the intersection among specialties is shaped by the complexity of the problems that research addresses. Specialization of research is a way to deal with the complexity of nature. One way of doing this is to erect specialties that focus on different aspects of (...) nature, and which do not overlap in subject matter. This view is the basis of Campbell’s “fish-scale” model of relations among specialties, and assumes that nature is descriptively complex in the sense of William C. Wimsatt . But specialties often overlap and are thus interactively complex as well. Here I argue that a kind of interactive complexity—collaborative complexity—arises when research on a problem must take the not-yet-established contents of multiple specialties into account. Such compound problems are exemplified by attempts to explain historical particulars, such as particular adaptations in single species, e.g., masculinization in Spotted Hyenas. (shrink)

Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, 06 september 2010.