The book presents the case that cognitive science should turn its attention to developing theories of human cognition that cover the full range of human perceptual, cognitive, and action phenomena. Cognitive science has now produced a massive number of high-quality regularities with many microtheories that reveal important mechanisms. The need for integration is pressing and will continue to increase. Equally important, cognitive science now has the theoretical concepts and tools to support serious attempts at unified theories. The argument is made (...) entirely by presenting an exemplar unified theory of cognition both to show what a real unified theory would be like and to provide convincing evidence that such theories are feasible. The exemplar is SOAR, a cognitive architecture, which is realized as a software system. After a detailed discussion of the architecture and its properties, with its relation to the constraints on cognition in the real world and to existing ideas in cognitive science, SOAR is used as theory for a wide range of cognitive phenomena: immediate responses ; discrete motor skills ; memory and learning ; problem solving ; language ; and development. The treatments vary in depth and adequacy, but they clearly reveal a single, highly specific, operational theory that works over the entire range of human cognition, SOAR is presented as an exemplar unified theory, not as the sole candidate. Cognitive science is not ready yet for a single theory – there must be multiple attempts. But cognitive science must begin to work toward such unified theories. (shrink)

We address the problem of musical variation (identification of different musical sequences as variations) and its implications for mental representations of music. According to reductionist theories, listeners judge the structural importance of musical events while forming mental representations. These judgments may result from the production of reduced memory representations that retain only the musical gist. In a study of improvised music performance, pianists produced variations on melodies. Analyses of the musical events retained across variations provided support for the reductionist account (...) of structural importance. A neural network trained to produce reduced memory representations for the same melodies represented structurally important events more efficiently than others. Agreement among the musicians' improvisations, the network model, and music‐theoretic predictions suggest that perceived constancy across musical variation is a natural result of a reductionist mechanism for producing memory representations. (shrink)

The main factor of intelligence is defined as the ability tocomprehend, formalising this ability with the help of new constructsbased on descriptional complexity. The result is a comprehension test,or C- test, which is exclusively defined in computational terms. Due toits absolute and non-anthropomorphic character, it is equally applicableto both humans and non-humans. Moreover, it correlates with classicalpsychometric tests, thus establishing the first firm connection betweeninformation theoretical notions and traditional IQ tests. The TuringTest is compared with the C- test and the (...) combination of the two isquestioned. In consequence, the idea of using the Turing Test as apractical test of intelligence should be surpassed, and substituted bycomputational and factorial tests of different cognitive abilities, amuch more useful approach for artificial intelligence progress and formany other intriguing questions that present themselves beyond theTuring Test. (shrink)

It is often claimed that there can be no such thing as a logic of scientific discovery, but only a logic of verification. By 'logic of discovery' is usually meant a normative theory of discovery processes. The claim that such a normative theory is impossible is shown to be incorrect; and two examples are provided of domains where formal processes of varying efficacy for discovering lawfulness can be constructed and compared. The analysis shows how one can treat operationally and formally (...) phenomena that have usually been dismissed with fuzzy labels like 'intuition' and 'creativity'. (shrink)

The paper consists of a reflexive exercise in which Herbert Simon's views concerning science are applied to his own research. It argues that what connected his ventures into so many different disciplinary domains was a search for complex, hierarchical systems. In the process, the paper establishes a close connection between Simon's insights and his focus on simulation. Instead of simulating Simon on a computer, though, it simulates Simon on paper. This exercise is then contrasted with Simon's own attempts to simulate (...) science. This comparison leads to a reflexive evaluation of Simon's simulations. (shrink)

This study investigated the cognitive processes involved in inductive reasoning. Sixteen undergraduates solved quadratic function–finding problems and provided concurrent verbal protocols. Three fundamental areas of inductive activity were identified: Data Gathering, Pattern Finding, and Hypothesis Generation. These activities are evident in three different strategies that they used to successfully find functions. In all three strategies, Pattern Finding played a critical role not previously identified in the literature. In the most common strategy, called the Pursuit strategy, participants created new quantities from (...) x and y, detected patterns in these quantities, and expressed these patterns in terms of x. These expressions were then built into full hypotheses. The processes involved in this strategy are instantiated in an ACT‐based model that simulates both successful and unsuccessful performance. The protocols and the model suggest that numerical knowledge is essential to the detection of patterns and, therefore, to higher‐order problem solving. (shrink)

Contemporary theories of learning postulate one or at most a small number of different learning mechanisms. However, people are capable of mastering a given task through qualitatively different learning paths such as learning by instruction and learning by doing. We hypothesize that the knowledge acquired through such alternative paths differs with respect to the level of abstraction and the balance between declarative and procedural knowledge. In a laboratory experiment we investigated what was learned about patterned letter sequences via either direct (...) instruction in the relevant patterns or practice in solving letter‐sequence extrapolation problems. Results showed that both types of learning led to mastery of the target task as measured by accuracy performance. However, behavioral differences emerged in how participants applied their knowledge. Participants given instruction showed more variability in the types of strategies they used to articulate their knowledge as well as longer solution times for generating the action implications of that knowledge as compared to the participants given practice. Results are discussed regarding the implications for transfer, generalization, and procedural application. Learning theories that claim generality should be tested against cross‐scenario phenomena, not just parametric variations of a single learning scenario. (shrink)

A theoretical framework Is presented that distinguishes among three knowledge sources that form the basis for generative performance. The three knowledge sources, termed conceptual, procedural, and utilizational competence, were implemented as a computational model that derives plans for counting procedures. In a previous analysis, Greeno, Riley, and Gelman (1984) developed a characterization of the conceptual competence (implicit understanding of general concepts and principles) associated with the skill of counting and related conceptual competence to various models of performance. In the current (...) work all three knowledge sources are formalized in a computer program (COUNTPLAN) that generates planning nets of counting procedures. The sufficiency of COUNTPLAN's knowledge components is demonstrated through its capacity to generate new plans for counting in novel settings from a core of conceptual competence. The utility of COUNTPLAN to facilitate the distinction between hypotheses of competence and hypotheses of performance is discussed. (shrink)

A central goal of cognitive science is to develop a general theory of transfer to explain how people use and apply their prior knowledge to solve new problems. Previous work has identified multiple mechanisms of transfer including (but not limited to) analogy, knowledge compilation, and constraint violation. The central hypothesis investigated in the current work is that the particular profile of transfer processes activated for a given situation depends on both (a) the type of knowledge to be transferred and how (...) it is represented, and (b) the processing demands of the transfer task. This hypothesis was investigated in two laboratory training studies. The results from Experiment 1 show that each mechanism predicts specific behavioural patterns of performance across a common set of transfer tasks. The results from Experiment 2 show that people can adaptively shift between transfer mechanisms depending on their prior knowledge and the characteristics of the task environment. A framework for the development of a general theory of transfer based on multiple mechanisms is proposed and implications of the theory are discussed for measuring and understanding knowledge transfer. (shrink)