The purpose of this paper is to show that conscientious objection to military service is essentially not a dilemma of freedom of conscience versus the duty to obey the law, but above all a dilemma between two conflicting patriotic moral obligations. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates that CO is justifiable on the basis of what is known as moderate patriotism, that is, out of a patriotism which is committed simultaneously to universal and particular values. The paper begins with a critical discussion (...) of theoretical weaknesses in liberal thought of CO. Then, the concept of moderate patriotism is presented, followed by a discussion of the notion of patriotic CO. The next stage presents a step Towards A Theory of PCO to Military Service and shows how it differs from other liberal theories of disobedience. The conclusion is that if CO on patriotic grounds is morally justifiable, it follows that this is an act committed within the framework of legitimate political discourse. Therefore, PCO is politically legitimate even if it is not always legal. In other words, the discussion of PCO offers a theoretical distinction between politicallegitimacy and legality. (shrink)

Is it morally important to vote? It is common to think so, but both consequentialist and deontological strategies for defending that intuition are weak. In response, some theorists have turned to a role-based strategy, arguing that it is morally important to be an excellent citizen, and that excellent citizens vote. But there is a lingering puzzle: an individual vote changes very little (virtually nothing in large-scale elections), so why would the excellent citizen be so concerned to cast a ballot? Why (...) bother with something that has so little effect on the common good? This paper answers by developing the idea of respect for a practice, and then arguing that respect for democracy will often require citizens to vote. (shrink)

In the first section I compare and contrast Rawls's and Gandhi's views on civil disobedience as a form of persuasion. I discuss the difficulties facing such forms of civil disobedience; the argument that such forms of civil disobedience are redundant is examined and rejected. Some modifications of Rawls's theory are suggested regarding when civil disobedience is justified and what form it should take. Also, I argue, as against Rawls, that the Rawlsian State should, when that is necessary to prevent anarchy, (...) be allowed to use severe measures against disobedients. In the second section I develop a second strand in Gandhi's thinking about civil disobedience, which links it with non?cooperation and which appears to be partly discrepant with his view of civil disobedience as a form of non?coercive persuasion. I attempt to show that Gandhian civil disobedience may effectively frustrate the evil policies of the State, without converting the State and yet without being coercive in any evil sense. (shrink)

In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority rule. It assigns to each voter a number of votes that is proportional to her stakes in the decision. It has been shown that, for collective decisions with two options, the weighted majority rule in combination with self-interested voters maximises the common good when the latter is understood in terms of either the sum-total or prioritarian sum of the voters’ well-being. The main result of my (...) study is that this argument for the weighted majority rule — that it maximises the common good — can be improved along the following three main lines. (1) The argument can be adapted to other criteria of the common good, such as sufficientarian, maximin, leximin or non-welfarist criteria. I propose a generic argument for the collective optimality of the weighted majority rule that works for all of these criteria. (2) The assumption of self-interested voters can be relaxed. First, common-interest voters can be accommodated. Second, even if voters are less than fully competent in judging their self-interest or the common interest, the weighted majority rule is weakly collectively optimal, that is, it almost certainly maximises the common good given large numbers of voters. Third, even for smaller groups of voters, the weighted majority rule still has some attractive features. (3) The scope of the argument can be extended to decisions with more than two options. I state the conditions under which the weighted majority rule maximises the common good even in multi-option contexts. I also analyse the possibility and the detrimental effects of strategic voting. Furthermore, I argue that self-interested voters have reason to accept the weighted majority rule. (shrink)

The Internet is used for every conceivable form of communication and it is therefore only natural that it should be used as an infrastructure even for protest and civil disobedience. The technology however brings with it the ability to carry out new forms of protest, in new environments and also involve changed consequences for those involved. This article looks at four criminal activities, which are used as active forms of Internet based protest in use today and analysis these forms in (...) relation to the traditional civil disobedience discourse. The analysis is done by studying four basic criteria (disobedience, civil, non‐violence and justification) found in tradition civil disobedience discourse and observing their applicability in online environments. The purpose of this article is to better understand the political protest activities carried out online and to see whether traditional civil disobedience theory embraces these new forms of political activism. (shrink)

Democratic societies tolerate intolerance, but that obligation finds its limit when the security of its citizens is jeopardized or its institutions of liberty are imperiled. Similarly, universities tolerate intolerance, but that obligation finds its limit when threatened by weaponized intolerance advocates who disenfranchise and denigrate community members and imperil academic norms and professional standards of conduct. Then, just as democratic societies must protect their threatened citizens and safeguard their imperiled institutions of liberty, so universities must protect their threatened community members (...) and safeguard their imperiled norms and standards. I argue for these conclusions by establishing a conflict between what the First Amendment legally permits university community members to express and what the norms of the university and the professional standards that structure academic freedom require from university community members. I argue that given the First Amendment, universities are legally obliged to tolerate even weaponized intolerance in campus public forums even if not in the classroom. I then recommend three responses to weaponized intolerance on campus that are consistent with the First Amendment: denunciation and protest, provision of safe space, and affirmation of academic values, norms, and standards. I reject three frequently encountered responses to weaponized intolerance as inconsistent with the First Amendment: heckler’s vetoes, student speech codes, and speaker bans. And I argue that one response—disruptive protest that falls short of a heckler’s veto—is legally permissible for students and faculty members but is ruled out for faculty members by academic norms and professional standards. (shrink)

Se analizan las bases hermenéuticas de toda decisión ética. La normatividad moral exige una comprensión de las circunstancias, porque solo desde su intelección se puede realizar un buen juicio ético. Si, para Peter Singer, las herramientas para tal aprehensión son de tipo racional, Mauricio Beuchot las amplía por medio de la intuición y la sutileza. Se discute si las pretensiones argumentales de Singer se actualizan en sus obras.