The thesis of this paper is that in dealing with problems of "mind," the philosopher of mind needs to be as well grounded in his relevant sciences (e.g. psychology, anthropology) as the philosopher of the physical sciences needs to be grounded in his relevant sciences (e.g. physics). The thesis of this paper is also that the psychological analysis of solipsism and the philosophical analysis are not independent (or at least not independent in all of their aspects), and that therefore the (...) psychological analysis sheds light on the philosophical, and vice versa. It is argued that solipsism is untenable on at least two grounds: because (1) there are no such physical phenomena as acts of "immediate perception," and because (2), that there can be no such thing as an "individual mind" without some form of a "group mind.". (shrink)

Through the use of Bayesian probability theory and Communication theory, a formal mathematical model of a Churchmanian Dialectical Inquirer is developed. The Dialectical Inquirer is based on Professor C. West Churchman's novel interpretation and application of Hegelian dialectics to decision theory. The result is not only the empirical application of dialectical inquiry but also its empirical (i.e., scientific) investigation. The Dialectical Inquirer is seen as especially suited to problems in strategic policy formation and in decision theory. Finally, specific application of (...) the inquirer is made to Popper's notions for ‘The Test of Severity’ of a scientific theory. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show that there are as many formulations of the process of falsification as there are archetypal, philosophical systems of inquiry. This paper explores several systems of inquiry which are based on Churchman's reading of the history of Western epistemology. It is argued that (1) the falsification of scientific theories can never be a purely formal process although it is perpetually open to formal exploration; (2) that contrary to current belief, falsification can never be (...) more certain than confirmation because falsification involves judgments which are no more certain than those involved in confirmation. The supposed asymmetry between confirmation and falsification is severely challenged. Finally, a Feyerabendian and a Hegelian notion of falsification are explicitly developed and contrasted. (shrink)

Experimental observations are often taken in order to assist in making a choice between relevant hypotheses ∼ H and H. The power of observations in this decision is here metrically defined by information-theoretic concepts and Bayes' theorem. The exact (or maximum power) of a new observation to increase or decrease Pr(H) the prior probability that H is true; the power of that observation to modify the total amount of uncertainty involved in the choice between ∼ H and H: the power (...) of a new observation to reduce uncertainty toward the ideal amount, zero; all these powers are systematically shown to be exact metrical functions of Pr(H) and Pr(o/H)/Pr(o)-1 where the numerator is the likelihood of the new observation given H, and the denominator is the "expectedness" of the observation. (shrink)

Previous papers have introduced the idea of a Dialectical Inquiring System (DIS), i.e., an Information System which for any issue presents strong pro and con arguments. The previous papers showed how the DIS could be made scientifically operational in terms of Russell Ackoff's Behavioral Theory of Communication. In this paper we show how the DIS can be represented in terms of Egon Brunswik's Lens Model. The Brunswik Lens Model formulation is most appropriate for the design of Behavioral Science experiments. It (...) also illuminates further properties of the DIS. We discuss both the use and current limitations of the model in terms of an example currently under experimental investigation. The paper, in effect, argues vigorously for a new methodology of science that is founded on anexplicit, systematic, andcontrolled use of conflict. (shrink)