I argue, contra Sabina Lovibond, that one cannot defend a viable form of moral realism from the perspective of linguistic conventionalism. Appealing to the later Wittgenstein, I argue that Wittgenstein's alleged linguistic conventionalism rests on the objective ground of the notion of a rule. While Wittgenstein acknowledges that the subjective and social context out of which we operate precludes getting at reality independent of a perspective, neither is he an anti-realist nor does he replace truth conditions with assertibility conditions. If (...) conventions are grounded in the notion of a rule, we can then use this conclusion to defend a form or moral realism. (shrink)

The present study was aimed at investigating whether and how the explicit representation of the decision outcome, framed in terms of lives saved or lost, could affect decision choices, emotional experience, and decision times in the course of a moral dilemma task. Decision outcomes were framed in a between-group design by means of smiling or injured faces depicting, respectively, the lives saved or lost with each choice. A control condition with no frame and no outcome was included. Results showed that (...) behavioral choices were highly resistant to the framing manipulation in both dilemma types. However, an overall reduction in the number of utilitarian choices and in the decision times, associated with an increase in unpleasantness during decision-making, was found, suggesting a progressive increase in aversive emotional activation favoring the rejection of utilitarian resolutions. Interestingly, at the beginning of the task, the POS group showed a delay in decision times as compared with the NOF group, specifically for footbridge-type dilemmas. This result might be interpreted as an interference effect temporarily slowing decision-making during the resolution of dilemmas in which the internal representation is spontaneously focused on the personal cost of causing intentional harm to others. (shrink)

This paper considers whether proposition – “x is not immoral but it is in poor taste” – is morally contradictory when considered from the standpoint of constructive ecumenical expressivism. According to CEE, pronouncements about poor taste and immorality have the following in common: they each convey a negative attitude towards x and intimate that x ought not to be done. Given this, P1 is vulnerable to a charge of contradiction, as it intimates that x is both something and not something (...) that ought not to be done. To avoid the putative contradiction, it is argued that an accusation of poor taste amounts to a negative attitude towards the treatment of a morally pertinent matter, thereby making the former parasitic on the latter. A morally relevant means of distinguishing between poor taste and immorality is therefore provided that endorses the expressivist tradition, and provides an account of societal norms. (shrink)