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On Sartwell’s Thesis That Knowledge is Merely True Belief

Southwest Philosophy Review 13 (1):123-127 (1997)

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Confidence in unwarranted knowledge.David B. Martens - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):143 - 164.details Epistemic minimalism affirms that mere true belief is sufficient for propositional knowledge. I construct a taxonomy of some specific forms of minimalism and locate within that taxonomy the distinct positions of various advocates of minimalism, including Alvin Goldman, Jaakko Hintikka, Crispin Sartwell, Wolfgang Lenzen, Franz von Kutschera, and others. I weigh generic minimalism against William Lycan’s objection that minimalism is incompatible with plausible principles about relations between knowledge, belief, and confidence. I argue that Lycan’s objection fails for equivocation but that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
Ignorance, Knowledge, and Two Epistemic Intuitions.Pierre Le Morvan - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):2123-2132.details One of the most venerable and enduring intuitions in epistemology concerns the relationship between true belief and knowledge. Famously articulated by Socrates, it holds that true belief does not suffice for knowledge. I discuss a matching intuition about ignorance according to which true belief does not suffice for the absence of ignorance. I argue that the latter intuition undercuts the New View of Ignorance and supports the Standard View of Ignorance. Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Epistemic means and ends: A reply to Hofmann.Pierre Le Morvan - 2008 - Synthese 162 (2):251-264.details How is epistemic justification related to knowledge? Is it, as widely thought, constitutive of knowledge? Is it merely a means to knowledge, or merely a means to something else, such as truth? In a recent article in this journal, Hofmann (2005, Synthese, 146(3), 357–369) addresses these questions in attempting to defend an important argument articulated by Sartwell (1992, The Journal of Philosophy, 89(4), 167–180) and reconstructed and criticized by Le Morvan (2002, Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 56(2), 151–168). (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Self-knowledge, belief, ability (and agency?).Lucy Campbell - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):333-349.details Matthew Boyle has defended an account of doxastic self-knowledge which he calls “Reflectivism”. I distinguish two claims within Reflectivism: that believing that p and knowing oneself to believe that p are not two distinct cognitive states, but two aspects of the same cognitive state, and that this is because we are in some sense agents in relation to our beliefs. I find claim compelling, but argue that its tenability depends on how we view the metaphysics of knowledge, something Boyle does (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 6 citations
’KNOWLEDGE IS TRUE BELIEF’ REBUTTED.Scott F. Aikin - 2010 - European Journal of Analytic Philosohy 6 (2):5 - 13.details Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations

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