Presenting the first comprehensive, in-depth study of hyperintensionality, this book equips readers with the basic tools needed to appreciate some of current and future debates in the philosophy of language, semantics, and metaphysics. After introducing and explaining the major approaches to hyperintensionality found in the literature, the book tackles its systematic connections to normativity and offers some contributions to the current debates. The book offers undergraduate and graduate students an essential introduction to the topic, while also helping professionals in related (...) fields get up to speed on open research-level problems. (shrink)

Kiesewetter defends the normativity of rationality by presenting a new solution to the problems that arise from the common assumption that we ought to be rational. He provides a defence of a reason-response conception of rationality, an evidence-relative account of reason, and an explanation of structural irrationality in relation to these accounts.

Personal Values is a delightful and enlightening read. It is teeming with novel insights, ground-breaking distinctions, rich examples, new delineations of the field, refreshing historical reminders, inventive arguments, unprecedented connections, identifications of neglected difficulties, and pioneering proposals. I shall focus here on three of these insights, which are illustrative of the pervasive scrupulousness and inventiveness of the book. The first is that there is a distinction between the supervenience base of values and their constitutive grounds. The second is that FA (...) is admittedly circular (because pro-attitudes have values as formal objects), but that this circularity is benign. The third proposal is that one important kind of for- someome-sake’s attitude⎯prototypically, love⎯is such that it is not justified by the properties it represents its object as exemplifying. This is a small sample of claims not meant to be representative of the book. The reason I have chosen to discuss these in particular is that, while finding them plausible and significant, I believe that each raises a worry that Rønnow-Rasmussen fails to address properly. I shall tentatively suggest a possible solution in each case. (shrink)

Belief is said to be essentially subject to a norm of truth. This view has been challenged on the ground that the truth norm cannot provide guidance on an intuitive inferentialist model of guidance and thus cannot be genuinely normative. One response to the No Guidance argument is to show how the truth norm can guide belief-formation on the inferentialist model of guidance. In this paper, I argue that this response is inadequate in light of emerging empirical evidence about our (...) system of belief-formation. I will then motivate an alternative response and present, in rough outline, a viable, reason-responsive model of epistemic guidance on which the truth norm can guide. (shrink)

On admet en général qu’il y a deux sortes de concepts normatifs : les concepts évaluatifs, comme bon, et les concepts déontiques, comme devoir. La question que soulève cette distinction est celle de savoir comment il est possible d’affirmer que les concepts évaluatifs sont normatifs. En effet, comme les concepts déontiques semblent constituer le coeur du domaine normatif, plus le fossé entre les deux sortes de concepts est grand, moins il paraîtra plausible d’affirmer que les concepts évaluatifs sont normatifs. Après (...) avoir présenté les différences principales entre les concepts évaluatifs et les concepts déontiques, et montré qu’il y a plus qu’une différence superficielle entre les deux sortes de concepts, j’examinerai la question de la normativité des concepts évaluatifs. Il deviendra apparent que même s’il s’agit de concepts ayant des fonctions différentes, il existe un grand nombre de relations entre les concepts évaluatifs, d’une part, et les concepts de devoir et de raison, d’autre part.It is generally accepted that there are two sorts of normative concepts : evaluative concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. The question that is raised by this distinction is how it is possible to claim that evaluative concepts are normative. As deontic concepts appear to be at the heart of normativity, the more there is a gap between evaluative and deontic concepts, the less it appears plausible to say that evaluative concepts are normative. After having presented the main differences between evaluative and deontic concepts, and shown that there is more than a superficial difference between the two sorts of concepts, the paper turns to the question of the normativitity of evaluative concepts. It will become clear that even if these concepts have different functions, there are a great many ties between evaluative concepts, on the one hand, and the concepts of ought and of reason, on the other hand. (shrink)

Ser eficaz a la hora de tomar los medios pertinentes para nuestros fines se ha considerado como uno de los aspectos paradigmáticos de la racionalidad. Sin embargo, reconocer la normatividad de la racionalidad instrumental parece implicar la problemática tesis de que uno debe tomar los medios apropiados para sus fines por el mero hecho de tener estos fines, con independencia de cuán irracionales o inmorales sean. En estas páginas defiendo una concepción de la racionalidad instrumental que permite a un mismo (...) tiempo reconocerla como normativa y afirmar que hay medios que uno no debería tomar aun cuando se proponga fines para los que son pertinentes. (shrink)