I defend an account of explanatory depth according to which explanations in the non-fundamental sciences can be deeper than explanations in fundamental physics.

Game theory is often used to explain behavior. Such explanations often proceed by demonstrating that the behavior in question is a Nash equilibrium. Agents are in Nash equilibrium if each agent’s strategy maximizes her payoff given her opponents’ strategies. Nash equilibriums are fundamentally static, but it is usually assumed that equilibriums will be the outcome of a dynamic process of learning or evolution. This article demonstrates that, even in the most simple setting, this need not be true. In two-strategy games (...) with just a single equilibrium, a family of imitative learning dynamics does not lead to equilibrium. (shrink)

Selection explanations explain some non-accidental generalizations in virtue of a selection process. Such explanations are not particulaizable - they do not transfer as explanations of the instances of such generalizations. This is unlike many explanations in the physical sciences, where the explanation of the general fact also provides an explanation of its instances (i.e. standard D-N explanations). Are selection explanations (e.g. in biology) therefore a different kind of explanation? I argue that to understand this issue, we need to see that (...) a standard D-N explanation of some non-accidental generalization (al Fs are Gs) may also ipso facto explain its contrapositive (all non-Gs are non-Fs), but the explanation is particularizable with respect to the former but not to the latter. This can be seen by noting that the Raven Paradox counterexample to the H-D model of confirmation also generates a counterexample to the D-N model of explanation (all ravens are black does not explain why the non-black shoe is a non-raven). In such cases it is natural to take the generalization with the positive predicates to have a particularizable explanation. However, this need not be the case, and in selection explanations it is the generalization with the positive predicates whose explanation is no particularizable. Thus there is no need to suppose that selection explanations are fundamentally different. (shrink)

In this paper, we offer an analysis of ‘group intentions.’ On our proposal, group intentions should be understood as a state of equilibrium among the beliefs of the members of a group. Although the discussion in this paper is non-technical, the equilibrium concept is drawn from the formal theory of interactive epistemology due to Robert Aumann. The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of group intentions that is informed by important work in economics and formal epistemology.

It is common in attempts to extend the theory of evolution to culture to generalize from the causal basis of biological evolution, so that evolutionary theory becomes the theory of copying processes. Generalizing from the formal dynamics of evolution allows greater leeway in what kinds of things cultural entities can be, if they are to evolve. By understanding the phenomenon of cultural transmission in terms of coordinated phenotypic variability, we can have a theory of cultural evolution which allows us to (...) avoid the various difficulties with the elaboration of informational entities such as the cultural replicator, or meme. Such an account is a boon to the project of evolutionary epistemology since it confirms the presumption in favor of the general adaptiveness of culture, illuminating rather than obscuring the inherent intimacy of our relationship to (e.g.) our ideas. (shrink)

In response to the attractive moral and politicalmodel of cosmopolitanism, this paper offers anoverview of some of the conceptual limitations to thatmodel arising from computer-mediated, interest-basedsocial interaction. I discuss James Bohman''sdefinition of the global and cosmopolitan spheres andhow computer-mediated communication might impact thedevelopment of those spheres. Additionally, I questionthe commitment to purely rational models of socialcooperation when theorizing a computer-mediated globalpublic sphere, exploring recent alternatives. Andfinally, I discuss a few of the political andepistemic constraints on participation in thecomputer-mediated public sphere (...) that threaten thecosmopolitan ideal.``Nature should be thanked for fostering socialincompatibility, enviously competitive vanity, andinsatiable desires for possessions and even power.Without these desires, all man''s excellent naturalcapacities would never be roused to develop.'''' Theultimate destiny for mankind, according to Kant whowrote these words in 1784, is to achieve through theuse of reason a `cosmopolitan existence'' or ``thematrix within which all the original capacities of thehuman race may develop.'''' Ironically, however, as Habermas andothers have realized, Kant''s carefully developedvision for `perpetual peace'' among nations and `worldcitizenship'' is now murky even as the electronicallymediated infrastructure of that matrix is rapidlydeveloping. Globalization as a process has intensifiedto the point where a new social, political, andeconomic condition has taken hold in the global arena.Recently this condition has been termed ``globality'''' –a term denoting a networked world characterized byspeed, mobility, risk, insecurity, andflexibility. And a debate is forming around thequestion of whether we are still in late modernity andexperiencing the culmination of modernity''s inherentlyglobalizing tendency or instead we have entered thenetworked age, in which the tension between collectiveand transformative identities and the networking logicof dominant institutions and organizations heralds theend of civil society. Inthis paper assume the latter but wish to explorefurther the political and epistemic constraints onparticipation in the computer-mediated public sphere.These constraints seem certain to impact the viabilityof a cosmopolitan public sphere. In the first sectionI shall discuss James Bohman''s definition of theglobal and cosmopolitan spheres and howcomputer-mediated communication (hereafter CMC) mightimpact the development of those spheres. In the secondsection, I question the commitment to purely rationalmodels of social cooperation when theorizing a globalpublic sphere. I explore recently proposed alternativeways of thinking about this issue in section three.And finally, I discuss a few of the political andepistemic constraints on participation in thecomputer-mediated public sphere that threaten thecosmopolitan ideal. (shrink)