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Clark Glymour. Discussion: Hypothetico-deductivism is hopeless. Philosophy of science, vol. 47 , pp. 322–325. - C. Kenneth Waters. Relevance logic brings hope to hypothetico-deductivism. Philosophy of science, vol. 54 , pp. 453–464. - Thomas R. Grimes. Discussion: Truth, content, and the hypothetico-deductive method. Philosophy of science, vol. 57 , pp. 514–522 [Book Review]

Journal of Symbolic Logic 57 (2):756-758 (1992)

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Mathematical Explanation by Law.Sam Baron - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):683-717.details Call an explanation in which a non-mathematical fact is explained—in part or in whole—by mathematical facts: an extra-mathematical explanation. Such explanations have attracted a great deal of interest recently in arguments over mathematical realism. In this article, a theory of extra-mathematical explanation is developed. The theory is modelled on a deductive-nomological theory of scientific explanation. A basic DN account of extra-mathematical explanation is proposed and then redeveloped in the light of two difficulties that the basic theory faces. The final view (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 18 citations
Grimes on the tacking by disjunction problem.Luca Moretti - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (17):16-20.details In this paper, I focus on the so-called "tacking by disjunction problem". Namely, the problem to the effect that, if a hypothesis H is confirmed by a statement E, H is confirmed by the disjunction E v F, for whatever statement F. I show that the attempt to settle this difficulty made by Grimes 1990, in a paper apparently forgotten by today methodologists, is irremediably faulty. Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Putting the irrelevance back into the problem of irrelevant conjunction.Branden Fitelson - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (4):611-622.details Naive deductive accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H & X, for any X—even if X is utterly irrelevant to H (and E). Bayesian accounts of confirmation also have this property (in the case of deductive evidence). Several Bayesians have attempted to soften the impact of this fact by arguing that—according to Bayesian accounts of confirmation— E will confirm the conjunction H & X less strongly than E confirms (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 33 citations

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