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Network formation by reinforcement learning: The long and medium run

Brian Skyrms

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Wisdom of the Crowds vs. Groupthink: Learning in Groups and in Isolation.Conor Mayo-Wilson, Kevin Zollman & David Danks - 2013 - International Journal of Game Theory 42 (3):695-723.details We evaluate the asymptotic performance of boundedly-rational strategies in multi-armed bandit problems, where performance is measured in terms of the tendency (in the limit) to play optimal actions in either (i) isolation or (ii) networks of other learners. We show that, for many strategies commonly employed in economics, psychology, and machine learning, performance in isolation and performance in networks are essentially unrelated. Our results suggest that the appropriateness of various, common boundedly-rational strategies depends crucially upon the social context (if any) (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 12 citations
(1 other version)The Place of Probability in Science: In Honor of Ellery Eells (1953-2006).Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.) - 2010 - Springer.details To clarify and illuminate the place of probability in science Ellery Eells and James H. Fetzer have brought together some of the most distinguished philosophers ... Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Self-Assembling Networks.Jeffrey A. Barrett, Brian Skyrms & Aydin Mohseni - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):1-25.details We consider how an epistemic network might self-assemble from the ritualization of the individual decisions of simple heterogeneous agents. In such evolved social networks, inquirers may be significantly more successful than they could be investigating nature on their own. The evolved network may also dramatically lower the epistemic risk faced by even the most talented inquirers. We consider networks that self-assemble in the context of both perfect and imperfect communication and compare the behaviour of inquirers in each. This provides a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 13 citations
Self-Assembling Games and the Evolution of Salience.Jeffrey A. Barrett - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):75-89.details This article considers how a generalized signalling game may self-assemble as the saliences of the agents evolve by reinforcement on those sources of information that in fact lead to successful action. On the present account, generalized signalling games self-assemble even as the agents co-evolve meaningful representations and successful dispositions for using those representations. We will see how reinforcement on successful information sources also provides a mechanism whereby simpler games might compose to form more complex games. Along the way, I consider (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Trust, risk, and the social contract.Brian Skyrms - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):21-25.details The problem of trust is discussed in terms of David Hume’s meadow-draining example. This is analyzed in terms of rational choice, evolutionary game theory and a dynamic model of social network formation. The kind of explanation that postulates an innate predisposition to trust is seen to be unnecessary when social network dynamics is taken into account. Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Natural Social Contracts.Brian Skyrms - 2013 - Biological Theory 8 (2):179-184.details There are two fundamental problems for instituting a social contract. The first is cooperating to produce a surplus; the second is deciding how to divide this surplus. I represent each problem by a simple paradigm game, a Stag Hunt game for cooperating to produce a surplus, and a bargaining game for its division. I will discuss these simple games in isolation, and end by discussing their composition. Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Dynamic Networks and the Stag Hunt: Some Robustness Considerations.Brian Skyrms - 2007 - Biological Theory 2 (1):7-9.details Download Export citation Bookmark

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