This paper deals with Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox, focussing on the infinite rule-regress as featured in Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. I argue that one of the most salient and popular proposed solutions (championed by John McDowell), which argues that rule-following is grounded in “custom,” “practice” or “form of life, remains unsatisfactory because part of this proposal is the rejection of further “theory” (commonly attributed to Wittgenstein) which seemingly makes it impossible to substantiate the claim of how customs, practices (...) or forms of life ground rule-following. I argue that this conundrum can be solved by introducing Wilhelm Dilthey’s overlooked notion of objective spirit as the objectivated sediment of historical human communality. This proposal allows us to substantiate Wittgenstein’s hints at the connection between rule-following and customs, practices, and forms of life without introducing “problematic theories.” Combining Wittgenstein’s views with Dilthey’s notion of objective spirit results in a solution that is neither skeptical nor straight, but therapeutic. (shrink)

This paper outlines a philosophical approach to emotional abilities. It sets out by charting different dimensions of emotional abilities, emphasising the distinction between the ability of an agent to develop an emotional repertoire and the ability to appropriately adapt specific emotions to specific situations. The paper elucidates this latter ability by focusing on two distinct varieties of it. First, there is a more active, explicit modulation of emotions. Second, there is also an implicit mode of emotion modulation that is habitualised. (...) This implicit mode will then be characterised more precisely by means of a phenomenological differentiation between feeling and emotion and by means of the concept of an affective position-taking (Stellungnahme) towards one’s own bodily affectedness. Only the implicit mode can appear on its own, while the explicit mode aims to be habitualised and thus to transition into the implicit mode. By means of the implicit mode, emotionally competent agents can adapt elastically to the situation. The concept of emotional change of aspect is explained by way of an example. Finally, further consequences for a philosophical approach to emotional abilities are formulated. (shrink)