The aim of this paper is to argue that Richard Rorty’s claim that pragmatism is opposed to all varieties of metaphysics is fundamentally mistaken. After detailing pragmatist reasons for thinking Rorty’s proposal is justified, I argue that there are more compelling pragmatist reasons to think Rorty’s metaphilosophical interpretation of pragmatism is rather problematic: firstly, Rorty has a narrow understanding of ‘metaphysics’ and he does not take into account Peirce’s argument that it is impossible to eliminate metaphysical concepts from ordinary language (...) and our scientific practices; secondly, Rorty’s Sellarsian philosophical anthropology and his proto-Brandomian theory of the constitution of norms are in fact instances of metaphysical positions. I conclude the paper by claiming that given that pragmatism is in fact supportive of a specific variety of metaphysics, the relationship between idealism and pragmatism ought to be seen as involving more convergence rather than great contestation. (shrink)

La primera parte de este artículo discute el poder persuasivo de las narrativas, especialmente en historia de la filosofía, ligándolas con la oposición entre razón y emoción y también con el conocido tema rortiano de las redescripciones. Además, presenta brevemente las líneas generales de la reconstrucción histórica hecha por Rorty y la tipología de géneros historiográficos que establece. La segunda parte muestra ejemplos del modo en que Rorty usa la persuasión al elaborar dos de tales géneros: las reconstrucciones históricas y (...) las reconstrucciones racionales. The first part of this paper discusses the persuasive power of narratives, especially when applied to history of philosophy, linking it with the opposition between reasons and emotions, and with the well-known rortyan theme of redescriptions. It also presents briefly the outlines of the historical reconstruction made by Rorty and the typology of historiographical genres established by him. The second part shows some examples of the way Rorty uses persuasion to develop two such genres: historical reconstructions and rational reconstructions. (shrink)