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  1. Mario Bunge’s Materialist Theory of Mind and Contemporary Cognitive Science.Peter Slezak - 2012 - Science & Education 21 (10):1475-1484.
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  • Mario Bunge: Matter and Mind: A Philosophical Inquiry.Peter Slezak - 2012 - Science & Education 21 (8):1213-1221.
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  • Is There Progress in Philosophy? The Case for Taking History Seriously.Peter P. Slezak - 2018 - Philosophy 93 (4):529-555.
    In response to widespread doubts among professional philosophers (Russell, Horwich, Dietrich, McGinn, Chalmers), Stoljar argues for a ‘reasonable optimism’ about progress in philosophy. He defends the large and surprising claim that ‘there is progress on all or reasonably many of the big questions.’ However, Stoljar’s caveats and admitted avoidance of historical evidence permits overlooking persistent controversies in philosophy of mind and cognitive science that are essentially unchanged since the 17th Century. Stoljar suggests that his claims are commonplace in philosophy departments (...)
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  • Demons, Deceivers And Liars: Newcomb’s Malin Génie. [REVIEW]Peter Slezak - 2006 - Theory and Decision 61 (3):277-303.
    A fully adequate solution to Newcomb’s Problem (Nozick 1969) should reveal the source of its extraordinary elusiveness and persistent intractability. Recently, a few accounts have independently sought to meet this criterion of adequacy by exposing the underlying source of the problem’s profound puzzlement. Thus, Sorensen (1987), Slezak (1998), Priest (2002) and Maitzen and Wilson (2003) share the ‘no box’ view according to which the very idea that there is a right choice is misconceived since the problem is ill-formed or incoherent (...)
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  • Did Descartes make a Diagonal Argument?Toby Meadows - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (2):219-247.
    This paper explores the idea that Descartes’ cogito is a kind of diagonal argument. Using tools from modal logic, it reviews some historical antecedents of this idea from Slezak and Boos and culminates in an orginal result classifying the exact structure of belief frames capable of supporting diagonal arguments and our reconstruction of the cogito.
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  • Diagonal Anti-Mechanist Arguments.David Kashtan - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):203-232.
    Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem is sometimes said to refute mechanism about the mind. §1 contains a discussion of mechanism. We look into its origins, motivations and commitments, both in general and with regard to the human mind, and ask about the place of modern computers and modern cognitive science within the general mechanistic paradigm. In §2 we give a sharp formulation of a mechanistic thesis about the mind in terms of the mathematical notion of computability. We present the argument from (...)
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