- Moral realism and reliance on moral testimony.Joshua Blanchard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1141-1153.details
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A Normative Approach to Artificial Moral Agency.Dorna Behdadi & Christian Munthe - 2020 - Minds and Machines 30 (2):195-218.details
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Non-accidental piety: reliable reasoning and modally robust adherence to the divine will.Joona Auvinen - 2021 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 91 (1):43-61.details
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Moral Worth, Credit, and Non-Accidentality.Keshav Singh - 2020 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10. Oxford University Press, Usa.details
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Moral Worth, Moral Awareness, and Virtuous Motives.Fabian Lorentzon - unknowndetails
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Moral Worth and Our Ultimate Moral Concerns.Douglas W. Portmore - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.details
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Actual Control - Demodalising Free Will.David Heering - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Oh, All the Wrongs I Could Have Performed! Or: Why Care about Morality, Robustly Realistically Understood.David Enoch & Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - 2023 - In Paul Bloomfield & David Copp (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism. Oxford University Press. pp. 434-462.details
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The Morality of Artificial Friends in Ishiguro’s Klara and the Sun.Jakob Stenseke - 2022 - Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy 5.details
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Manifestations of Virtue.Arden Ali - 2020 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10. Oxford University Press, Usa.details
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Nonhuman Moral Agency: A Practice-Focused Exploration of Moral Agency in Nonhuman Animals and Artificial Intelligence.Dorna Behdadi - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburgdetails
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Aspects of Blame: In which the nature of blame, blameworthiness, standing to blame and proportional blame are discussed.Marta Johansson Werkmäster - 2023 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
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The Goals of Moral Worth.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.details
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Is it OK to Make Mistakes? Appraisal and False Normative Belief.Claire Field - 2019 - Dissertation, University of St Andrewsdetails
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Moral Worth Requires a Fundamental Concern for What Ultimately Matters.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscriptdetails
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