The idea of taiji 太極 as the supreme ultimate of the universe has been largely avoided by Chinese philosophers over the past several hundred years, and the same is true of the notions of yin 陰, yang 陽, and qi 氣. The main objection seems to be that these notions operate in a way inconsistent with modern science, but the present essay argues that when we view yin and yang as complements rather than opposites, they can be applied consistently with (...) modern science and in a way that takes in both mental and physical instances. This can lead us to recognize the similarity between the mental and the physical along lines that permit us to revive the notion of qi and treat it as not only in keeping with modern ideas but as also allowing a new kind of validity to the ancient notion of taiji. The West has a lot to learn from a proper modernized account of these concepts, but these are lessons that Westernizing Chinese thinkers also need to learn. (shrink)

Feminists have argued that autonomous thought and decision-making are attained through respectful parenting and are blighted or destroyed when the parenting is disrespectful or abusive. However, it can be argued that young children are already capable of thinking and deciding things for themselves, so when sexist or abusive parenting leads to an adult incapable of such autonomy, the parenting or other social influences have destroyed what was originally there. It turns out, too, that the thinking and deciding sides of autonomy (...) are actually inseparable aspects of one and the same personal trait/virtue, and it can be shown that the other major human virtues—and human rationality as a whole—also have this dual aspect. We can go on to see that this duality is best interpreted in terms of the indissoluble complementarity of yin 陰 and yang 陽. (shrink)

This chapter corrects for Susan Sontag's undeserved neglect by contemporary ethical philosophers by bringing awareness to some of the unique metaethical insights born of her reflections on photographic representations of evil. I argue that Sontag's thought provides fertile ground for thinking about: (1) moral perception and its relation to moral knowledge; and (2) the epistemic and moral value of our emotional responses to the misery and suffering of others. I show that, contrary to standard moral perception theory (e.g. Blum 1994), (...) Sontag holds that we can have general moral perceptual knowledge. I then explore Sontag's idea that certain emotional responses, like sympathy and compassion, can sometimes be impertinent, in virtue of their having false or illusory content. I explain why this is so, and show the epistemic and motivational problems it poses for moral sentimentalism. (shrink)