This paper argues that many philosophical arguments within the education discourse are too little embedded in their own historical contexts. Starting out from the obvious fact that philosophers of education use sources from the past, the paper asks how we can deal with the arguments that these sources contain. The general attitude within philosophy of education, which views arguments as timeless, is being challenged by the insight that arguments always depend upon their own contexts. For this reason, citing past authors, (...) heroes, or enemies without respecting the context says more about our interest at the present time than it does about the times of the authors examined. Conversely, the contextual approach helps us to avoid believing that ‘timeless truths’ are to be found in different texts of different ages. However, the present contribution in no way advocates a total relativization of statements. Quite the contrary; it claims that the contextual approach helps us to understand the traditions and contexts within which we ourselves, as researchers, are positioned. And this self‐awareness is believed to be the proper starting position for theoretical statements about education. (shrink)

Professor Whitty has endorsed the consensus that research into education is empirical social science, distinguishing ‘educational research’ which seeks directly to influence practice, and ‘education research’ that has substantive value but no necessary practical application.The status of the science here is problematic. The positivist approach is incoherent and so supports neither option. Critical educational science is virtually policy-inert. The interpretive approach is empirically sound but, because of the value component in education, does not support education research either, or account for (...) this component.A solution to the latter problem is sought in the debate between Carr and Hirst on the relationship between philosophy and education. This shows Carr making claims that rely on a conception of philosophy that he rejects, while Hirst insists on this conception, uses it to justify practical claims, but denies that this is possible.To achieve a practically relevant analysis of educational research, both need to include second-order, normative, conceptual enquiry into the philosophies that drive educational policy-making and partly regulate teaching methodology. Deweyan, first-order, ‘reflective practice’ needs, then, to be supplemented with second-order reflection.Educational research is philosophy- not science-driven, and is value-led. Consequently, it has the status not of scientific discovery but of practical recommendation. (shrink)

In doing philosophy we need to be aware of the awkwardness of thinking in terms of having a method, still more any kind of 'methodology'. Instead we might consider the different ways in which philosophy has been conceived in terms of contrasts: for example between the written and the spoken word, between exposition and dialogue, and between—in Richard Rorty's terms—systematic and edifying philosophy. This article offers no easy answer to how to proceed, suggesting rather that those who attempt philosophy need (...) to be alert to the possibilities and dangers that lie on either side. This is not just any kind of alertness, but a matter of close reading rather than skimming, of carefully attending—listening—to those with whom we engage, whether they are people or texts. (shrink)

The idea that educational research should be 'scientific', and ideally based on randomised control trials, is in danger of becoming hegemonic. In the face of this it seems important to ask what other kinds of educational research can be respectable in their own different terms. We might also note that the demand for research to be 'scientific' is characteristically modernist, and thus arguably local and temporary. It is then tempting to consider what non-modernist approaches might look like. The purpose of (...) this article is to sketch a case for one particular reaction against modernist thinking: romanticism. How might our understanding (apprehension, sense) of education be changed by readmitting the insights and perspectives of romanticism? And, crucially, what confidence could we have in educational research that was thus inspired and that took the 'romantic turn'? (shrink)

Focusing on the context of graduate training in educational research in the United States today, this article is organized into two principal parts. The first overviews the state of research training in order to emphasize the preoccupation with, indeed dominance of, study of methodology. This has turned ‘how to do research’ into valuing method as technology for its own sake, and thus into technologization. The second part turns to three critiques of technology that together point to potential totalization in research: (...) technologization that limits research processes and potential results. The writings of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Ellul provide a broad frame; the three specific critiques are found in contributions from Henry Adams, Aldous Huxley, and Donna Haraway. The conclusion calls for a questioning of the current form of graduate training and by implication its hold on current research practice. (shrink)

It is possible to raise and solve philosophical problems with no very clear idea of what philosophy is, what it is trying to do, and how it can best do it; but no great progress can be made until these questions have been asked and some answer to them given ( Collingwood, 2005 , p. 1).

This article enquires into the value of 'concepts' as a framework for the school curriculum by questioning their contribution towards our responsibilities for thinking about the earth. I take Derrida's deconstructive reading of Plato's Timaeus to show how spaces in meaning can be revealed, and more transgressive ways of knowing invited in. Derrida's Kh ra marks the opportunity for something new, productive and unforeseeable to arise as the play of traces unfurls. A deconstructive reading of the geography national curriculum policy (...) exposes the impracticality and impossibility of following the text as a definitive scheme and basis for curriculum planning. The paper ends with a spacing of a real place for the geography curriculum by appropriating four different ways of knowing Whitby, a harbour town in north-east England, outside the conceptual scheme. The paper contrasts an approach that is essentially general, conceptual and at the level of the plan, map or net, with a deconstructive approach that welcomes in other, more ethically responsible and imaginative meanings. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.