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  1. Stereotypes, Ingroup Emotions and the Inner Predictive Machinery of Testimony.José M. Araya & Simón Palacios - 2022 - Topoi 41 (5):871-882.
    The reductionist/anti-reductionist debate about testimonial justification (and knowledge) can be taken to collapse into a controversy about two kinds of underlying monitoring mechanism. The nature and structure of this mechanism remains an enigma in the debate. We suggest that the underlying monitoring mechanism amounts to emotion-based stereotyping. Our main argument in favor of the stereotype hypothesis about testimonial monitoring is that the underlying psychological mechanism responsible for testimonial monitoring has several conditions to satisfy. Each of these conditions is satisfied by (...)
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  • Rational Inference: The Lowest Bounds.Cameron Buckner - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):697-724.
    A surge of empirical research demonstrating flexible cognition in animals and young infants has raised interest in the possibility of rational decision‐making in the absence of language. A venerable position, which I here call “Classical Inferentialism”, holds that nonlinguistic agents are incapable of rational inferences. Against this position, I defend a model of nonlinguistic inferences that shows how they could be practically rational. This model vindicates the Lockean idea that we can intuitively grasp rational connections between thoughts by developing the (...)
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  • Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) show subtle signs of uncertainty when choices are more difficult.Matthias Allritz, Emma Suvi McEwen & Josep Call - 2021 - Cognition 214 (C):104766.
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  • Rational Inference: The Lowest Bounds.Cameron Buckner - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):1-28.
    A surge of empirical research demonstrating flexible cognition in animals and young infants has raised interest in the possibility of rational decision-making in the absence of language. A venerable position, which I here call “Classical Inferentialism”, holds that nonlinguistic agents are incapable of rational inferences. Against this position, I defend a model of nonlinguistic inferences that shows how they could be practically rational. This model vindicates the Lockean idea that we can intuitively grasp rational connections between thoughts by developing the (...)
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  • Capuchin monkeys (sometimes) go when they know: Confidence movements in Sapajus apella.Travis R. Smith, Audrey E. Parrish, Courtney Creamer, Mattea Rossettie & Michael J. Beran - 2020 - Cognition 199 (C):104237.
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  • Flexible information-seeking in chimpanzees.Alexandra G. Rosati, Elisa Felsche, Megan F. Cole, Rebeca Atencia & Joshua Rukundo - 2024 - Cognition 251 (C):105898.
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