We seek to probe into the question of whether it is moral to administer a punishment on a criminal both in his lifetime and posthumously. Is it moral to punish a murderer both during his lifetime by sentencing him, for instance, to life imprisonment, and posthumously—let us assume—by burial in a separate section of the cemetery exclusively assigned for murderers, which would perpetuate their ignominy? We consider that a discussion of this crux might raise valuable insights and questions regarding the (...) philosophy of punishment. We will aim to examine this issue from several perspectives: utilitarianism, retributivism, and expressivism. Moreover, we shall consider it as a means for preventing an exacerbation of the punishment by more cruel means. Furthermore, we will point out some problems which should be considered that may arise from the posthumous penalty. (shrink)

History is, indeed, little more than the register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind.Edward Gibbon,The Decline and Fall of the Roman EmpireI argue that there are duties that can be called ‘Moral duties due to history’ or, in short, ‘Duties to History’ (DTH). My claim is not the familiar thought that we need to learn from history on how to live better in the present and going forward, but that history itself creates moral duties. In addition to those (...) obligations we currently recognise in response to the present and the future, there also exist special obligations in response to the past. If convincing, this means that our lives ought to be guided, in part, not only by our obligations to the living but by our DTH. This is a surprising result, with significant and sometimes perplexing implications. My focus is on the obligations of individuals in the light of history rather than on collective duties.I argue that there are duties that can be called ‘Moral duties due to history’ or, in short, ‘Duties to History’ (DTH). My claim is not the familiar thought that we need to learn from history on how to live better in the present and going forward, but that history itself creates moral duties. In addition to those obligations we currently recognise in response to the present and the future, there also exist special obligations in response to the past; such as obligations to good people in the past, but going beyond them. If convincing, this means that our lives ought to be guided, in part, not only by our obligations to the living but by our DTH. This is a surprising result, with significant and sometimes perplexing implications. My focus is on the obligations of individuals in the light of history rather than on collective duties. (shrink)