Invention of artificial general intelligence is predicted to cause a shift in the trajectory of human civilization. In order to reap the benefits and avoid pitfalls of such powerful technology it is important to be able to control it. However, possibility of controlling artificial general intelligence and its more advanced version, superintelligence, has not been formally established. In this paper, we present arguments as well as supporting evidence from multiple domains indicating that advanced AI can’t be fully controlled. Consequences of (...) uncontrollability of AI are discussed with respect to future of humanity and research on AI, and AI safety and security. This paper can serve as a comprehensive reference for the topic of uncontrollability. (shrink)

This paper critically engages with how life not worth living (LNWL) and cognate concepts are used in the field of beginning-of-life bioethics as the basis of arguments for morally requiring the application of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and/or germline genome editing (GGE). It is argued that an objective conceptualization of LNWL is largely too unreliable in beginning-of-life cases for deriving decisive normative reasons that would constitute a moral duty on the part of intending parents. Subjective frameworks are found to be (...) more suitable to determine LNWL, but they are not accessible in beginning-of-life cases because there is no subject yet. Conceptual and sociopolitical problems are additionally pointed out regarding the common usage of clear case exemplars. The paper concludes that a moral requirement for the usage of PGD and GGE cannot be derived from the conceptual base of LNWL, as strong reasons that can be reliably determined are required to limit reproductive freedom on moral grounds. Educated predictions on prospective well-being might still be useful regarding the determination of moral permissibility of PGD and/or GGE. It is suggested that due to the high significance of subjective experience in the normativity of beginning-of-life bioethics, the discipline is called to more actively realize the inclusion of people with disabilities. This regards for instance research design, citation practices, and language choices to increase the accessibility of societal debates on the reproductive ethics of genetic technologies. (shrink)

Wer das eigene Leben für sinnlos hält, wird oft auch die Ansicht haben, dass es besser wäre, nicht geboren worden zu sein. In diesem Beitrag wird untersucht, ob Äußerungen wie „Ich wäre lieber nicht geboren“ sinnvoll sind und ob sie sich begründen lassen. Im einleitenden Teil wird gezeigt, dass diese Äußerungen entgegen einer von manchen Philosophen vertretenen Ansicht nicht sprachwidrig sind. Im zweiten Teil wird David Benatars „Asymmetrieargument“ in modifizierter Form verteidigt. Benatar bringt dieses Argument zur Verteidigung der These vor, (...) dass es stets einen Schaden darstellt, in die Existenz zu gelangen. Es wird gezeigt, wie sich das Argument unter Beachtung der Differenz zwischen „jemanden eines Gutes berauben“ und „jemandem ein Gut vorenthalten“ verteidigen lässt. Im dritten Teil werden die praktischen Implikationen des modifizierten Asymmetrieargumentes ausbuchstabiert. Es führt nicht zu einem Anti-Natalismus, wohl aber zur These, dass es rational ist, die eigene Existenz zu bedauern. (shrink)

This article argues for the elimination of the concept of life worth living from philosophical vocabulary on three complementary grounds. First, the basic components of this concept suffer from multiple ambiguities, which hamper attempts to ground informative evaluative and classificatory judgments about the worth of life. Second, the criteria proposed to track the extension of the concept of life worth living rest on unsupported axiological assumptions and fail to identify precise and plausible referents for this concept. And third, the concept (...) of life worth living is not shown to serve any major evaluative or classificatory purpose besides those served by already available axiological concepts. By eliminating the concept of life worth living, philosophers will free themselves of the task of addressing ill-posed axiological questions and ground reflection about the worth of life on more rigorous conceptual foundations. (shrink)