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  1. Perceiving External Things and the Time‐Lag Argument.Sean Enda Power - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):94-117.
    We seem to directly perceive external things. But can we? According to the time‐lag argument, we cannot. What we directly perceive happens now. There is a time‐lag between our perceptions and the external things we seem to directly perceive; these external things happen in the past; thus, what we directly perceive must be something else, for example, sense‐data, and we can only at best indirectly perceive other things. This paper examines the time‐lag argument given contemporary metaphysics. I argue that this (...)
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  • Top Mysteries of the Mind: Insights From the Default Space Model of Consciousness.Ravinder Jerath & Connor Beveridge - 2018 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 12.
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  • Does consciousness exist independently of present time and present time independently of consciousness.Birgitta Dresp-Langley & Jean Durup - 2012 - Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):45-49.
    While some are currently debating whether time may or may not be an illusion, others keep devoting their time to the science of consciousness. Time as such may be seen as a physical or a subjective variable, and the limitations in our capacity of perceiving and analyzing temporal order and change in physical events definitely constrain our understanding of consciousness which, in return, constrains our conceptual under-standing of time. Temporal codes generated in the brain have been considered as the key (...)
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  • Sense-data.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Sense data are the alleged mind-dependent objects that we are directly aware of in perception, and that have exactly the properties they appear to have. For instance, sense data theorists say that, upon viewing a tomato in normal conditions, one forms an image of the tomato in one's mind. This image is red and round. The mental image is an example of a “sense datum.” Many philosophers have rejected the notion of sense data, either because they believe that perception gives (...)
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  • sSecial relativity and perception: the singular time of philosophy and physics.Stephen E. Robbins - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1:500-531.
    The Special Theory of Relativity (STR) holds sway as a theory of time due to its apparently successful predictive structure regarding time-related phenomena such as the increased life spans of mesons or retarded clocks on jets circling the globe, and due to the relativization of simultaneity intrinsic to this theoretical structure. Yet the very structure of the theory demands that such very real physical effects be construed as non-ontological. The scope and depth of this contradiction is explored and, if these (...)
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  • Phenomenal Time and its Biological Correlates.Ram L. P. Vimal & Christopher J. Davia - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (5):560-572.
    Our goal is to investigate the biological correlates of the first-person experience of time or phenomenal time. ‘Time’ differs in various domains, such as (i) physical time (e.g., clock time), (ii) biological time, such as the suprachiasmatic nucleus, and (iii) the perceptual rate of time. One psychophysical-measure of the perceptual rate is the critical flicker frequency (CFF), in which a flashing light is perceived as unchanging. Focusing on the inability to detect change, as in CFF, may give us insight into (...)
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  • Natural World Physical, Brain Operational, and Mind Phenomenal Space-Time.Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Carlos F. H. Neves - 2010 - Physics of Life Reviews 7 (2):195-249.
    Concepts of space and time are widely developed in physics. However, there is a considerable lack of biologically plausible theoretical frameworks that can demonstrate how space and time dimensions are implemented in the activity of the most complex life-system – the brain with a mind. Brain activity is organized both temporally and spatially, thus representing space-time in the brain. Critical analysis of recent research on the space-time organization of the brain’s activity pointed to the existence of so-called operational space-time in (...)
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  • Why Am I Me and Not Someone Else?Tim Klaassen - manuscript
    In this article I discuss the seeming contingency of the fact that one is the specific person that one is. Here, I propose that this contingency is illusory.
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  • Solely Generic Phenomenology.Ned Block - 2015 - Open MIND 2015.
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  • Present moment, past, and future: mental kaleidoscope.Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts - 2014 - Frontiers Psychology 5:395.
    It is the every person's daily phenomenal experience that conscious states represent their contents as occurring now. Following Droege (2009) we could state that consciousness has a peculiar affinity for presence. Some researchers even argue that conscious awareness necessarily demands that mental content is somehow held “frozen” within a discrete progressive present moment. Thus, phenomenal content seems to be minimally conscious if it is integrated into a single and coherent model of reality during a “virtual window” of presence.
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