The logic of worldviews provides a consistent method of comparison between multiple worldviews. The present paper connects the logic of worldviews to important historical and contemporary influences. Beginning with its roots in semiotics, an account of epistemology emerges which is mediated by a belief system. We show that Charles Peirce’s pragmatistic theory of inquiry is the bedrock beneath the logic of worldviews. We formulate it as a generalized version of inquiry with underlying game-theoretic semantics. In this paper, we extend Peirce’s (...) triadic model of signs to cover knowledge mediated by systems of beliefs. Michael Polanyi’s account of personal commitment includes a subsidiary/focal distinction that views theoretical frameworks as tools for interpreting orders of reality through actual practices of research. We also see how a precedent is set by Johan Georg Hamann’s epistemology of belief, recovered by Ludwig Wittgenstein, using reason as an interpretation of God’s speech in nature. We argue that Thomas Kuhn’s theory of inquiry and worldviews (or paradigms) may be fruitfully contrasted with Peirce’s theory, with reasoning by abduction, deduction, and induction occurring within the community of inquirers. The upshot is that although worldviews may be adopted for non-rational reasons, one can meaningfully compare worldviews through a method proposed by Alasdair MacIntyre: the proponent of a theory learns the language of competing theories and uses them as a metatheory to show how one’s own theory may not have the resources to resolve certain problematic situations. Our result is a meta-linguistic falsification in the sense of Peirce’s semiotics and pragmaticism: the competing theory may be used to show that the object theory does not have a strategy at its disposal to interpret the anomalous phenomenon. (shrink)